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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the predictive effects of the Marine Corps Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) on first-term retention while controlling for varying levels of 
deployment tempo.  In order to successfully predict reenlistment decisions in the current 
era, the model must control for conditions that affect a Marine’s choice to reenlist, none 
being more influential than deployments to Operation Iraqi/Enduring Freedom.  Adding 
deployment tempo variables to the logit prediction model enables Marine Corps 
manpower planners to properly account for changing conditions in the “Long War.”  
The results of this analysis find the increased deployment tempo in recent years 
has had a negative affect on reenlistments.  To counter this effect, the Marine Corps has 
steadily increased its SRB budget and subsequent SRB offers to all Marines.  In order to 
improve the accuracy of reenlistment predictions, this thesis estimated a model with 
alternative indicators of deployment tempo.  The model developed is parsimonious, yet 
predicts accurately.  Validation results show that if the model was utilized to predict 
FY07 reenlistment rates, it would have average prediction errors of 12 percent for the 27 
high-density MOSs, who make up nearly 61 percent of the first-term population.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Marine Corps was authorized in 2007 to increase its active duty end strength 
from 175,000 to 202,000.  Additionally, the Global War on Terror has become the Long 
War and the Marine Corps is facing continued high levels of deployment tempo.  Even 
with these two constraints, the Marine Corps continues to meet its first-term retention 
goals.  Meeting these retention goals has come at cost: a steep increase in the amount and 
number of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) offered to Marines. According to the 
Marine Corps SRB Planner, Captain Paul Bock, the SRB budget has increased from $58 
million in Fiscal Year 2002 to $268 million in Fiscal Year 2007.1  The increased 
deployment tempo from the Long War and end strength increases are the reasons for this 
increase in SRB payments offered. 
The main tool utilized by Marine Corps Manpower Planners to appropriately 
shape the force is the SRB program.  The goal of the SRB program is to attract and retain 
the desired number of Marines each fiscal year (FY) by offering a monetary incentive to 
reenlistment-eligible Marines.  However, the SRB Program is limited by appropriations 
each FY by Congress and this pool of funding is limited.  This budget constraint poses a 
problem for Marine Corps Manpower Planners in determining how much and to whom 
they offer SRBs to each FY in order to shape the force to the desired manning levels. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the predictive effects of the Marine Corps 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus on first-term retention when controlling for varying levels 
of deployment tempo.  Given the required end strength increase and sustained high 
deployment tempo during the Long War, the SRB Program will serve as a critical 
 
 
                                                 
1 Paul Bock, e-mail to author, October 22, 2008. 
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component in shaping the force for the future.  Ultimately, this thesis will propose a new 
model for Marine Corps Manpower Planners to utilize in forecasting SRB amounts to be 
offered each fiscal year.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
How has the increased deployment tempo since 9/11 affected first-term enlisted 
reenlistment rates by MOS? 
Has the increased deployment tempo affected the magnitude of the effect of SRBs 
on reenlistment behavior? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Is there a difference in reenlistment rates for Marines with and without 
dependents? 
What are the effects of not deploying at all on individuals’ reenlistment decisions? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide the Marine Corps with a statistical analysis of 
reenlistment behavior for first-term Marines in the Post-9/11 Era.  It will also provide an 
easily updatable model from which Marine Corps Manpower Planners can determine 
SRB levels by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for an upcoming fiscal year.  The 
results from the model in this thesis can be compared to the prediction model currently in 
use by the SRB Planner. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis analyzes the current SRB Model utilized by the Marine Corps.  It also 
analyzes the effects of both deployment and SRB offers on reenlistment decisions for 
first-term enlisted Marines.  The data used for this research was obtained by the Marine 
Corps Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) and includes three datasets.  The first 
dataset contains reenlistment and separation personnel data for first-term Marines from 
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FY03 through FY07.  The second dataset contains SRB payments made during the same 
timeframe.  The third dataset contains deployment data for all Marines from FY03 
through FY07.  This study is primarily quantitative in nature, utilizing a multivariate 
logistic analysis to predict the effects of SRB offers and deployment tempo on individual 
reenlistment behavior.   
F. OVERVIEW OF THE SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS 
PROGRAM 
The general concept of the SRB Program is outlined in Marine Corps Order 
7220.24M as follows: 
The SRB program was established to assist in attaining and sustaining 
adequate numbers of career enlisted personnel in designate Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS’s) and within particular years-of-service 
groupings.  The program provides a monetary incentive for a reenlistment 
of at least 4 years at three career decision points during the first 14 years 
of service.  Marine Corps Bulleting 7220 series, published separately and 
revised as required to meet the needs of the Marine Corps, identify MOS’s 
eligible for a SRB and their multiples.  The intent of this program is that 
Marines who receive a bonus for reenlistment in a particular skill serve the 
entire period of reenlistment in that skill.2  
The Marine Corps pays the SRB in a lump-sum payment to Marines upon an 
eligible reenlistment.  The amount paid is determined by rank and MOS at time of 
reenlistment, and length of the reenlistment term.  For Zone A, first-term Marines, there 
are three rank categories; E-3 and below, E-4, and E-5 and above.3  Zone A eligible 
Marines are defined as those possessing “17 months to 6 years of active Marine Corps 
Service of which at least 17 months was continuous active service other than for 




                                                 
2 Marine Corps Order 7220.24M, Subject:  Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, May 1990, 1-2. 
3 Marine Corps Administrative Message, Subject:  MCBUL 7220 Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program and FY09 Broken Service SRB (BSSRB) Program, June 2008, 1. 
4 Ibid., 1. 
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 amounts are calculated.  In years past, prior to FY08, the payment was based on the 
product of a Marine’s base pay, additional years of obligated service, and an SRB 
multiple (1-5).5   
There have also been yearly increases in the maximum amount of SRB that can be 
paid to an eligible reenlisting Marine.  For FY09 the total amount paid for an SRB cannot 
exceed $90,000.6  This amount has increased dramatically since the onset of the Global 
War on Terror.  In comparison to FY09, the cap for FY02 SRB payments was limited to 
$30,000 for Zone A reenlistments.7  This change highlights the importance of using the 
SRB as the primary retention tool for Marine Corps Manpower Planners.  This 
importance is also highlighted in the most recent MCBUL 7220 which states: 
Retaining our combat experienced Marines, and their combat experienced 
leaders, is one of the Commandant’s highest priorities and is a crucial 
component of achieving the future 202k Marine Corps.8 
Clearly, the SRB Program will be a vital component in shaping the force of the Marine 
Corps during the current heightened deployment cycle and push to increase the force to 
202,000 Marines. 
G. SUMMARY 
This thesis analyzes the current Marine Corps SRB program and how the 
increased deployment tempo since the onset of the Global War on Terror has affected 
reenlistment behavior of first-term Marines, focusing on the effect of SRB payments.  
The results of this study will be of significant value to Marine Corps Manpower Planners 
in determining the appropriate rate of SRB payment to offer to each MOS in shaping the 
force for the Long War and continued high level of deployment tempo experienced by the 
Marine Corps.  Ultimately, this study will provide manpower planners with an easily 
                                                 
5 Marine Corps Administrative Message, Subject:  MCBUL 7220 Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program, July 2006, 1. 
6 Ibid., 1. 
7 Marine Corps Administrative Message, Subject:  MCBUL 7220 Multiples for the Fiscal Year 2002 
(FY02) Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program, September 2001, 1. 
8 Ibid., 1. 
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updatable spreadsheet, based on multivariate logistical regressions, which will allow 
forecasting of SRB payment offers in order to shape the force to the desired levels.   
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter II is a literature review of 
several previous studies on the Marine Corps SRB Program, as well as the impacts of the 
Long War and its associated deployment tempo on reenlistment behavior.  This chapter 
provides an in-depth look into how the Marine Corps determines what SRB amounts to 
be offered.  It also examines how the increased deployment tempo since 9/11 has 
impacted individual reenlistment decisions.  Chapter III describes the data utilized to 
conduct this research.  This includes both descriptive and summary statistics, research 
methodology, and the general logistical regression models.  This chapter describes in 
detail the data used and develops the hypothesized model for multivariate regression 
analysis.  Chapter IV contains the results of the logistical regression models and 
introduces a Microsoft Excel Model for use by Marine Corps Manpower Planners.  The 
multivariate results will predict reenlistment rates by Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS).  These results will be contained in the Microsoft Excel Model for use by 
manpower planners to determine SRB offers.   Chapter V contains a validation of the 
prediction model along with some basic sensitivity analysis.  Chapter VI concludes by 
summarizing the findings of the study and offering recommendations.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The study of the effects of increases in deployment tempo for the Marine Corps 
has been an important theme since the onset of the Global War on Terror.  The main 
focus of these Marine Corps-sponsored studies has been on the effect of deployments on 
retention.  There have been far fewer studies that actually predict reenlistment rates.  
Specifically, one Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study predicts reenlistment rates for a 
given Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) level.  However, this is a dated study that 
does not account for the current military environment.  Being able to accurately predict 
reenlistment behavior is imperative in ensuring Marine Corps Manpower Planners can 
shape the force for the future.    
Although there have been several recent studies on deployment tempo and its 
effects, none of them have tied in the predictive effects of the SRB program.  This thesis 
looks at the current model and procedures for determining the SRB level, as well as 
incorporating the deployment tempo in order to formulate a new SRB model that utilizes 
more recent reenlistment data to better reflect present day conditions.  
This chapter is divided into two main parts.  This first part will present the current 
SRB model and its use by the Marine Corps.  The second part will present five studies 
(four conducted by CNA and one by the RAND Corporation) that analyze how increases 
in deployment tempo have impacted Marine Corps retention.  These studies share a 
common result in that the increased deployment tempo since 9/11 has negatively 
impacted reenlistment behavior in some way throughout the past several years. 
B. CURRENT SRB MODEL 
1. North (1994) 
James H. North’s analysis, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment 
Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves” is the cornerstone from which the Marine 
Corps sets its SRB amounts to this day.  According to the Marine Corps SRB planner, 
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Captain Paul Bock, the analysis derived in the North study is still used as an essential 
component in determining what SRB amounts are offered each fiscal year.9  Each year 
the Center for Naval Analyses updates the prediction model produced by North and 
submits the new predictions to the Marine Corps.  These predictions become the main 
part of the actual Marine Corps SRB model.  CNA’s logistic regression model is 
combined with a weighed average of the current inventory and future requirements to 
produce an SRB offer for each Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).10    
North’s study was composed of two key elements: estimating Marines 
reenlistment probabilities and estimating the costs of paying SRBs.  He estimated 
reenlistment probabilities using historical reenlistment data from fiscal years 1987 
through 1992 utilizing the CNA ARSTAT tracking file.  The study focused on Zone A 
enlisted Marines making reenlistment decisions in their first 72 months of active service.  
The data population for each fiscal year included only those first-term Marines who 
either reenlisted or separated during that particular fiscal year, regardless of end of active 
service (EAS) date.  To ensure he was getting reliable multivariate results he restricted 
his data to only those Marines that were recommended and eligible for reenlistment.  This 
helped to negate any bias in his coefficient estimates due to Marines being in the sample 
that had no chance of reenlisting in the first place.  One further data restriction to mitigate 
any potential bias was that he removed all MOS’s that were classified as “restricted”, 
meaning that there were limits placed on the number of Marines that could reenlist in a 
particular MOS.  His final dataset contained 40,984 observations for the six fiscal years.  
His statistical model was somewhat simple to ensure it could be replicated and 
used in a practical sense by manpower planners.  He acknowledges that prior studies have 
shown that other factors, not included in his model, affect reenlistment behavior.  
However, he states his purpose is to “develop a model that accurately predicts 
reenlistment behavior and is easy to update.”11  Included in his model were economic 
                                                 
9 Paul Bock, e-mail to author, August 21, 2008.  
10 Ibid. 
11 James H. North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral 
Occupational Moves,” Center for Naval Analyses, September 1994, 27. 
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factors that he hypothesized would affect reenlistment behavior.  These included national 
unemployment rates for 20-24-year-old males and a military-to-civilian pay index.  He 
also included dummy variables for the Marine’s Occupational Field (OccField) and what 
level of SRB (0-5) the Marine received upon reenlisting.  A multiple of zero indicated 
that the Marine did not receive an SRB payment offer.  The final two controls in his 
model were for contract length (four versus six years) and whether or not it was the 
Marine’s first enlistment contract.  These six factors were used as controls, or 
independent variables, in his statistical analysis.   
North utilized a logistical regression model in estimating reenlistment 
probabilities.  This choice of model specification is due to reenlisting being a binary 
variable requiring the model to be nonlinear.  His dependent variable, probability of 
reenlistment, was a function of the six controls described in the above paragraph.  His 
results are somewhat intuitive.  The results show that higher bonus levels, higher 
unemployment rates, and higher relative military to civilian pay are linked with higher 
reenlistment rates.    Table 1 depicts his multivariate results.  Utilizing the results from 
the logistical regression model he developed the estimated reenlistment probabilities by 
MOS. 
Table 1.   Logit coefficient estimates for Zone A reenlistments (FY1987 – 1992)12 
 Mean Value Coefficient Derivative
SRB multiple level 1.487 0.374** 0.071 
Six-year prior contract length  0.046 0.260** 0.050 
Second enlistment contract 0.031 0.821** 0.157 
Civilian unemployment rate 9.868 0.079** 0.015 
Military-to-civilian pay ratio 121.72 0.011* .002 
Occfield    
                                                 
12 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
28-30. 
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   01 Personnel and administration 0.056 1.789** .342 
   02 Intelligence 0.005 0.033 0.006 
   04 Logistics 0.035 0.608** 0.116 
   08 Field artillery 0.039 0.269** 0.051 
   11 Utilities 0.017 0.199* 0.038 
   13 Engineer 0.064 0.338** 0.065 
   15 Printing and reproduction 0.001 1.847** 0.353 
   18 Tank and assault amphibious 0.011 0.149 0.028 
   21 Ordnance 0.034 0.402** 0.077 
   23 Ammunition 0.006 0.002 0.000 
   25 Operational communications 0.054 0.963** 0.184 
   26 Signal intelligence 0.012 -0.052 -0.010 
   28 Data/communications maintenance 0.027 0.025 0.005 
   30 Supply 0.085 1.288** 0.246 
   31 Traffic management 0.002 1.757** 0.336 
   33 Food service 0.020 0.821** 0.157 
   34 Audit, finance and accounting 0.008 1.007** 0.191 
   35 Motor transport 0.055 0.304** 0.058 
   40 Data systems 0.012 0.476** 0.091 
   41 Marine Corps exchange 0.001 2.963** 0.566 
   43 Public affairs 0.002 -0.184 -0.035 
   44 Legal services 0.004 0.930** 0.178 
   46 Training and visual information 0.002 0.887** 0.170 
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   55 Music 0.009 1.353** 0.258 
   57 Nuclear, biological and chemical 0.004 0.534** 0.102 
   58 Military police and corrections 0.020 0.181 0.034 
   59 Electronics maintenance 0.015 0.087 0.017 
   60 Aircraft maintenance-fixed wing 0.078 0.275** 0.053 
   61 Aircraft maintenance-helicopter 0.052 0.330** 0.063 
   63 Avionics 0.039 0.078 0.015 
   64 Advanced avionics 0.031 0.151 0.029 
   65 Aviation ordnance 0.020 0.434** 0.083 
   68 Weather service 0.002 0.406 0.078 
   70 Airfield services 0.015 0.891** 0.170 
   72 Air control/air support 0.013 0.269* 0.051 
   73 Air traffic control and flight crews 0.009 -0.154 -0.030 
Constant 1 -4.389**  
Mean Value of the dependent variable 0.257   
**Statistical significance at the 1-percent level.      *Statistical significance at the 5-percent level. 
He predicted reenlistment rates by OccField and SRB level for fiscal year 1995 
using the results of the logistical regression model and estimates provided from Marine 
Corps Manpower Planners for the six control variables.  Table 2 below depicts these 
results.  Predicted reenlistment rates ranged from 9.4 percent (multiple of 0 for the Public 
Affairs OccField) to 94.0 percent (multiple of 5 for the Marine Corps Exchange 




Table 2.   Predicted FY 1995 reenlistment rates by occupational field and SRB 
multiple (percentages)13 
             SRB Multiple 
Occfield Zero One  Two Three  Four Five
   01 Personnel and administration 42.4 51.7 60.9 69.3 76.7 82.7
   02 Intelligence 12.3 17.0 22.9 30.1 38.6 47.7
   03 Infantry 10.6 14.7 20.1 26.8 34.7 43.6
   04 Logistics 18.2 24.4 32.0 40.6 49.8 59.1
   08 Field artillery 13.5 18.5 24.8 32.4 41.0 50.3
   11 Utilities 12.8 17.6 23.7 31.1 39.6 48.8
   13 Engineer 14.7 20.0 26.7 34.6 43.5 52.8
   15 Printing and reproduction 42.5 51.8 61.0 69.5 76.8 82.8
   18 Tank and assault amphibious 12.4 17.0 23.0 30.2 38.6 47.8
   21 Ordnance 15.4 20.9 27.7 35.8 44.8 54.1
   23 Ammunition 10.8 14.9 20.3 27.0 35.0 43.9
   25 Operational communications 24.1 31.6 40.1 49.4 58.6 67.3
   26 Signal intelligence 10.7 14.8 20.2 26.9 34.8 43.7
   28 Data/communications maintenance 11.6 16.0 21.6 28.6 36.8 45.9
   30 Supply 30.4 38.8 48.0 57.3 66.1 73.9
   31 Traffic management 40.9 50.1 59.4 68.0 75.5 81.8
   33 Food service 21.2 28.2 36.3 45.3 54.6 63.7
   34 Audit, finance and accounting 26.1 33.9 42.8 52.1 61.2 69.6
                                                 
13North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
34-35. 
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   35 Motor transport 14.0 19.2 25.6 33.4 42.1 51.4
   40 Data systems 16.2 21.9 29.0 37.2 46.3 55.6
   41 Marine Corps exchange 70.7 77.8 83.6 88.1 91.5 94.0
   43 Public affairs 9.4 13.1 18.0 24.2 31.7 40.3
   44 Legal services 24.2 31.7 40.3 49.5 58.8 67.5
   46 Training and visual information 22.1 29.2 37.5 46.6 55.9 64.8
   55 Music 31.4 39.9 49.1 58.4 67.1 74.8
   57 Nuclear, biological and chemical 17.3 23.4 30.7 39.2 48.4 57.7
   58 Military police and corrections 12.7 17.5 23.5 30.9 39.4 48.6
   59 Electronics maintenance 11.9 16.4 22.2 29.3 37.6 46.7
   60 Aircraft maintenance-fixed wing 14.2 19.4 26.0 33.8 42.6 51.9
   61 Aircraft maintenance-helicopter 14.8 20.1 26.8 34.7 43.6 52.9
   63 Avionics 12.2 16.8 22.6 29.8 38.2 47.3
   64 Advanced avionics 13.3 18.2 24.4 31.9 40.6 49.8
   65 Aviation ordnance 16.1 21.8 28.9 37.1 46.2 55.5
   68 Weather service 15.3 20.8 27.7 35.7 44.7 54.0
   70 Airfield services 22.8 30.0 38.4 47.6 56.9 65.7
   72 Air control/air support 13.6 18.7 25.0 32.7 41.4 50.6
   73 Air traffic control and flight crews 9.2 12.9 17.7 23.8 31.2 39.8
 
Utilizing the predicted reenlistment rates derived from the logistical regression 
model North developed cost estimates.  He calculated the “bonus cost of an additional 
reenlistment” for each OccField at each SRB level.  The amounts calculated for 
additional bonus costs ranged from just over $17,000 to nearly $207,000 per additional 
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reenlistment.  Essentially, the additional bonus cost is capturing the economic rent that is 
required to entice more Marines to reenlist.  The higher economic rents are representative 
of OccFields that began with higher initial reenlistment rates (prior to an increase in the 
SRB multiple).  These cost estimates can help manpower planners determine which 
OccFields are the most or least cost-effective to offer an SRB.  
C. DEPLOYMENT TEMPO  
1. Hattiangadi, Lee, and Quester (2005) 
The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps asked the Center for Naval 
Analyses to examine the effects of deployment tempo on retention.  In October 2005, 
CNA published the annotated briefing: “Deployment Tempo and Retention in the Marine 
Corps.”  This is the first in a series of CNA studies on deployment tempo and its effects 
on retention in the Marine Corps.  The authors’ results were based on both statistical 
analysis and input from focus groups.   
The statistical analysis of their study focused on all Marines making reenlistment 
decisions in fiscal year 2004.  The dataset was limited to those Marines who either 
reenlisted or separated during the fiscal year; regardless of their accession date, 
reenlistment zone, or end of active service (EAS) date.  The dataset did not include 
Marines who were involuntarily separated or extended beyond fiscal year 2004.  They 
analyzed reenlistment rates as a function of number of days deployed.  The analysis 
shows that reenlistment rates drop as number of deployed days increase.  The study also 
finds that as deployed days increase single Marines are far less likely to reenlist than their 
married counterparts.  Figure 1 depicts the reenlistment rate for first-term Marines as a 
function of deployed days for both single and married Marines.  The study also finds that 
single Marines deploy more heavily than do married Marines.  In fact, for fiscal year 
2004, single Marines averaged 49 more deployed days than married Marines.   This issue 
was also addressed in the focus groups. 
 15
 
Figure 1.   FY04 FTAP Reenlistment Rates14 
 
The second part of their analysis was based on focus groups held throughout the 
Marine Corps.  They conducted 26 focus groups, 13 from each coast.  The focus groups 
were comprised of 20 to 30 Marines of varying grades and operational elements of the 
Marine Corps.  Some of the key problems brought about from the focus groups were: 
¾ Individual Augment (IA) assignments. 
¾ Changing deployment dates and short time between deployments. 
¾ Lost leave. 
¾ Availability of downtime. 
¾ Lack of opportunities for off-duty education. 
¾ Single Marines chosen for quick fill deployments. 
The authors made several recommendations based on their statistical analysis and 
the results of the focus groups.  They describe their recommendations as “things that the 
Marine Corps could do to ease the stress that high deployment tempo causes.”15  The 
recommendations were: (1) Examine the possibilities for exchanges between heavy 
deployers and nondeployers; (2) Continue to review and validate the IA process; (3) 
                                                 
14 A.U. Hattiangadi, and L.G. Lee, and A.O. Quester, “Deployment Tempo and Retention in the 
Marine Corps,” Center for Naval Analyses, October 2005, 6. 
15 Ibid., 25. 
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Consider forward deployed education vans; and (4) Consider a wartime Regular 
Reenlistment Bonus for all.  Several of these recommendations have already made their 
way into Marine Corps policy.  For instance, in fiscal year 2007 the Marine Corps offered 
an assignment incentive pay bonus of $10,000 for all enlisted Marines.16 
2. Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller (2006) 
In 2006, the RAND Corporation published the study; “How Deployments Affect 
Service Members.”  This study focused on how more recent deployments have affected 
military personnel from all branches of the armed forces.  Their conceptual approach 
included analyzing the economical, sociological, and psychological effects of 
deployments on personnel.   The authors’ results were based on focus group research and 
statistical analysis of survey data. 
Focus groups were conducted with both enlisted personnel and officers from each 
service during the first half of 2004.  There was a wide array of topics covered, ranging 
from expectations of service life to deployment experiences.  Deployment stress and the 
many ways it can be caused was one of the key topics discussed by service members.  
Even personnel who never deployed reported being stressed by deployments due to the 
increased workload and work hours.  This resulted from shortages of personnel who were 
left behind to take care of business as usual.  Even though there were many negative 
facets of deployments brought up, the focus groups also provide numerous positive facets 
of deploying.  Two key examples of these positive aspects were increased pay and the 
opportunity for increased responsibility.  Additionally, there were mixed opinions as to 
whether the deployment tempo would affect their reenlistment decisions.   
The second part of their research was based on survey data collected by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  Their analysis of the data “focused on stress 
and the intention to stay in the military.”17  The overwhelming results of the survey 
analysis showed that factors which increased stress “decreased the likelihood of intention 
                                                 
16 Marine Corps Administrative Message, Subject:  MCBUL 7220 FY07 End Strength Incentive, 
February 2007, 1. 
17 J. Hosek, and J. Kavanagh, and L. Miller, “How Deployments Affect Servicemembers,” RAND 
Corporation, 2006, 1. 
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to stay.”18  Some of these factors included longer than usual work days, uncertainty in 
deployments, and spousal attitudes.  The author’s note that these results are consistent 
with those found in the focus groups. 
Based on their analysis the authors make several recommendations for policy and 
future research.  Policy implications include:19 
¾ Deployments should be spread widely across qualified service members 
and units rather than limited to repeatedly deploying the same individuals. 
¾ Military official should examine additional ways to compensate personnel 
who are sent on long, difficult, or dangerous deployments or are deployed 
frequently. 
¾ It is worth considering additional pay and recognition for nondeployed 
personnel who are often called upon to work longer than the usual duty-
day. 
¾ It may be worthwhile to consider ways to remove the stigma, or 
reluctance, to seek professional counseling and, further, to consider 
additional training to enable service members to be more effective in 
counseling or supporting one another. 
They also recommend further research be conducted on the issue of how deployments 
affect reenlistment.  They also note that: “future work should also revisit the question of 
how reenlistment bonuses and special pays affect reenlistment of personnel with 
extensive deployments.”20  
3. Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford (2006) 
This study, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post 9/11 Era: The Effects of 
Deployment Tempo on Marines With and Without Dependents” is the second in a series 
of Marine Corps-sponsored studies by the Center for Naval Analyses on deployment 
tempo and retention specific to the Marine Corps.  This study focused on deployment 
tempo and retention for fiscal year 2004, but also looked at fiscal years 2002 and 2003.  
The dataset for each fiscal year was limited to those Marines who either reenlisted or 
                                                 
18 Hosek, and Kavanagh, and Miller, “How Deployments Affect Servicemembers,” xix. 
19 Ibid., xxi-xxiii. 
20 Ibid., xxiv. 
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separated during the particular fiscal year; regardless of their accession date, reenlistment 
zone, or end of active service date.  The dataset did not include Marines who were 
involuntarily separated or extended beyond the fiscal year being analyzed.  The main 
finding for first-term Marines is that both not deploying at all and being heavily deployed 
resulted in lower reenlistment rates.  The authors also found that single Marines are more 
negatively affected by high deployment tempo than their married counterparts. 
The authors analyze two key factors affecting reenlistment decisions for first-term 
Marines.  They first analyze the effects of number of days deployed on reenlistment rates.  
Figure 2 shows the reenlistment rates for fiscal year 2004 for first-term Marines as a 
function of number of days deployed in the current contract.  Days deployed is defined as 
“the sum of five categories of time spent away from home: operational days, exercise 
days, unit training days, home station training days, and mission support temporary duty 
(TDY) days.”21  As deployed days increase, the associated reenlistment rate declines.  
Additionally, reenlistment rates are higher for those Marines that deploy 1-100 days 
compared with those who did not deploy at all.   
 
 
Figure 2.   FY04 reenlistment rates for first-term (zone A) Marines, by number of days 
deployed22  
                                                 
21 A.U. Hattiangadi, and R.W. Shuford, and A.O. Quester, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post 9/11 
Era:  The Effects of Deployment Tempo on Marines With and Without Dependents,” Center for Naval 
Analyses, January 2006, 7. 
22 Ibid., 8.  
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The study next analyzes the effect of dependency status on reenlistment rates.  
They look at reenlistment rates from fiscal year 1995 through 2004 and the results are 
very significant.  As shown in Figure 3, in each of the ten fiscal years first-term Marines 
with dependents reenlist at higher rates than those without dependents.  This finding also 
holds true for second and third-term Marines in fiscal year 2004, although, the difference 
is much smaller than for first-termers.  The authors also found that deployment to a crisis 
area decreased the probability of reenlistment. 
 
 
Figure 3.   First-term reenlistment rates for Marines, by dependency status23 
In their statistical analysis (multivariate logistic regression), they find that 
deployment to a crisis area reduces the probability of first-term reenlistment by 
8percentage points, all else equal.  This effect was fairly similar for Marines with and 
without dependents.  They define a crisis area as “primarily Iraq or Afghanistan.”24  
These results were compared to fiscal years 2002 and 2003. 
Similar reenlistment models were constructed for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.  For 
fiscal year 2002, deployment to a crisis area actually increased the reenlistment 
probability by 5 percentage points.  This, however, could be due to deploying to a crisis 
area being far less common than in fiscal year 2004 (2 percent of Zone A Marines 
 
                                                 
23 Hattiangadi, and Shuford, and Quester, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post 9/11 Era:  The Effects 
of Deployment Tempo on Marines With and Without Dependents,” 13. 
24 Ibid., 13. 
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deployed to a crisis area in fiscal year 2002 compared to 49 percent in fiscal year 2004).  
For fiscal year 2003, deploying to a crisis area decreased the reenlistment probability by 
16 percentage points.   
The study also analyzed reenlistment and continuation patterns for career enlisted 
Marines and officers.  As mentioned before, those without dependents reenlisted or 
continued at lower rates than did their counterparts with dependents.  However, being 
heavily deployed had little to no effect on the reenlistment patterns of career Marines and 
had and increasing effect for the continuation of officers.  
4. Quester, Hattiangadi, Lee, and Shuford (2006) 
The Center for Naval Analyses study “Marine Corps Deployment Tempo and 
Retention in FY05” is very similar to the previous CNA study.  However, it analyzed the 
deployment tempo and retention patterns specific to fiscal year 2005.  The dataset was 
limited to those Marines who either reenlisted or separated during the fiscal year; 
regardless of their accession date, reenlistment zone, or end of active service date.  The 
dataset did not include Marines who were involuntarily separated or extended beyond 
fiscal year 2005.  For fiscal year 2005, there were several key differences in the 
reenlistment patterns of first-term Marines. 
Despite similar differences in reenlistment rates for Marines with and without 
dependents, those Marines who were considered most heavily deployed (500+ days) 
actually had increasing reenlistment rates.  This increase held true for both Marines with 
and without dependents.  Figure 4 below shows this increase for both Marines with and 
without dependents.  Similar to fiscal year 2004, being heavily deployed most affects 
Marines without dependents.  Even with the increase for most heavily deployed Marines, 
being deployed to a crisis area still negatively affected reenlistments.  
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Figure 4.   FY05 first-term reenlistment rates by days deployed for Marines with and 
without dependents25 
Similar to 2004, deployments to a crisis area reduce reenlistment rates for first-
term Marines.  This is particularly true for multiple deployments to a crisis area.  As a 
Marine’s number of deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan increase, the reenlistment rate 
decreases.  Also, Marines without dependents deployed an average of 57 more days than 
did Marines with dependents.  This was very similar to the results found in the 2004 
CNA study.  Similar to their earlier studies they conducted logistic regressions for their 
statistical analysis. 
Their statistical analysis consisted of logistic regressions to explain reenlistment 
behavior.  The major findings for first-term Marines are: 
• Reenlistment probabilities for Marines with dependents increase slowly as 
days increase until the number of days deployed reaches 500 days.  At that 
point, they begin to increase more rapidly. 
• Reenlistment probabilities for Marines without dependents decrease 
slowly as days deployed increase until the number of days deployed 
reaches 500 days.  At that point, they increase. 
• For Marines both with and without dependents, reenlistment probabilities 
decrease as the number of deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan increase.26 
                                                 
25 A.U. Hattiangadi, and L.G. Lee, and A.O. Quester, “Marine Corps Deployment Tempo and 
Retention in FY05,” Center for Naval Analyses, March 2006, 7. 
26 A.U. Hattiangadi, and L.G. Lee, and A.O. Quester, “Marine Corps Deployment Tempo and 
Retention in FY05,” Center for Naval Analyses, March 2006, 11. 
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Statistical analysis of career enlisted Marines and officers showed that both number of 
days deployed and number of deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan increase the 
reenlistment and continuation rates almost across the board. 
5. Lien, Quester, and Shuford (forthcoming, October 2008) 
The most recent Center for Naval Analyses study on deployment tempo and 
retention is “Marine Corps Deployment Tempo and Retention from FY04 through 
FY07.”  This study takes on the same general theme as the previous two CNA studies on 
deployment tempo and retention.  This study analyzed reenlistment decisions for fiscal 
years 2004 through 2007; however, it also did a separate analysis of fiscal year 2007.  
The dataset for each fiscal year was limited to those Marines who either reenlisted or 
separated during the particular fiscal year; regardless of their accession date, reenlistment 
zone, or end of active service date.  The dataset did not include Marines who were 
involuntarily separated or extended beyond the fiscal year being analyzed.  Overall 
findings are comparable with the previous studies in that deployment days and number of 
deployments to the Iran/Afghanistan country group reduce reenlistment rates.  There are 
some subtle differences, though. 
The study finds that overall reenlistment rates are affected by number of 
deployment days and number of deployments for first-term Marines.  For the entire 
period, fiscal year 2004 through 2007, there is a negative relationship between number of 
days a Marine deploys and whether or not that Marine reenlists.  The study also illustrates 
that the share of Marines deployed, both in terms of deployed at all and specifically to the 
Iran/Afghanistan country group, have increased from 2004 to 2007.  In fiscal year 2004, 
58 percent of first-term Marines deployed to the Iraq/Afghanistan country group at least 
once.  In 2007, the percentage deployed at least once rose 20 points to 78 percent.  
Overall, there has been a gradual increase in the total number of deployed days 
experienced by first-term Marines. 
Despite the increase in overall deployment days, there have not been substantial 
decreases in overall reenlistment rates.  Figure 5 highlights that overall reenlistment rates 
have remained quite steady. In fact, there was a rather large increase in fiscal year 2007. 
This increase is highlighted by the authors in some detail. 
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Figure 5.   FTAP reenlistment rates by year of decision and number of days deployed27 
 
This study finds that the reenlistment rate for first-term Marines in fiscal year 
2007 is 41.9 percent.  This is a significant increase over previous years.  The authors 
highlight three reasons for this:  
(1) In FY07 there were no longer caps on the amount of first-term Marines 
that could reenlist.   
(2) Higher SRB amounts were offered.  
(3) Recommended and eligible first-term Marines that were to reenlist in 
FY08 were allowed to reenlist in FY07.28 
This rate, however, differs from the official Marine Corps reenlistment rate.  According 
to Captain Paul Bock, the Marine Corps SRB Planner, the official reenlistment rate for 
fiscal year 2007 was only 31.5 percent.29  This large difference is likely due to 
differences in the population used.  The official Marine Corps rate was derived from just 
those Marines who had an end of active service date in fiscal year 2007.  The CNA 
reenlistment rate was derived from anyone that reenlisted in fiscal year 2007, regardless 
of EAS.  As with the previous studies, this study also found that Marines without 
dependents were less likely to reenlist as deployments increased. 
                                                 
27 D. Lien, and A. Quester, and R. Shuford, “Marine Corps Deployment Tempo and Retention from 
FY04 through FY07,” Center for Naval Analyses, October 2008, 11. 
28 Ibid., 9. 
29 Paul Bock, e-mail to author, September 22, 2008. 
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The statistical analysis consisted of multivariate logistic regressions very similar 
to the previous studies.  Logistic regressions predicted reenlistment behavior for all four 
years and then just for fiscal year 2007.  Some of the key findings are listed below: 
¾ Days deployed decreased the probability of reenlistment for the entire 
period and for just fiscal year 2007. 
¾ In all cases having dependents increased the probability of reenlistment. 
¾ Number of deployments to Iraq/Afghanistan decreased the probability for 
reenlistment for Marines without dependents for the entire period.  
However, number of deployments to Iraq/Afghanistan increased the 
probability of reenlistment for Marines with and without dependents for 
fiscal year 2007. 
Statistical analysis of career Marines and officers shows that there has been little to no 
effect of high deployment tempo on their reenlistment or continuation patterns.  This is 
consistent with the analysis provided in earlier studies. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a review of the current SRB model, as well as 
published work on deployment tempo and how it affects retention.  Several conclusions 
can be made from this review: 
¾ Deployment tempo affects first-term Marine reenlistment behavior. 
Despite subtle changes from fiscal year to fiscal year, increased 
deployment leads to decreased reenlistment rates. 
¾ Increased deployment tempo more negatively affects Marines without 
dependents than their counterparts with dependents. 
¾ Deployment tempo has had little effect on the reenlistment behavior and 
continuation behavior of career Marines and officers. 
This thesis builds upon the model produced by James H. North (1994) and 
incorporates the effects of deployment tempo on reenlistment decisions for first-term 
Marines.  It also provides an easily updatable model to assist Marine Corps Manpower 
Planners in shaping the force that better accounts for the increased deployment tempo 
since 9/11. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Total Force Data Warehouse 
Two datasets were created from the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW) that included background information on all enlisted Marines who made 
reenlistment decisions between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, including on their 
deployments.  The first dataset included all reenlistment decisions.  It also contained 
demographic variables including gender, marital status, race, and number of dependents.  
This dataset also included information on the Marine’s rank, Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS), End of Current Contract Date (ECC), and End of Active Service Date 
(EAS).  The second dataset received from the TFDW included information on 
deployments for all Marines contained in the first dataset.  These two datasets were 
merged with the Bureau of Labor Statistics data and Selective Reenlistment Bonus data 
as discussed below. 
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) warehouses current and historic labor 
force and economic data.  Historic national-level unemployment rates and usual weekly 
earnings for 20-24 year males were retrieved from the BLS master database.  The 
unemployment rate/information is based on a national-level monthly average for the 
period between 2002 and 2007.  Similarly, the usual weekly earnings data is based on a 
national-level quarterly average of the usual weekly earnings for 20-24 year old males.  
These two variables are used in the reenlistment models as proxies for employment 
conditions in the civilian labor market.    
3. United States Marine Corps 
Each fiscal year the Marine Corps publishes a MCBUL 7220 that outlines the 
SRB offers by MOS for the upcoming fiscal year.  These SRB offers were retrieved for 
each fiscal year and merged with the TFDW dataset by MOS and fiscal year. 
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B. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
The final dataset for this analysis represents pooled cross-sectional data of 
enlisted first-term Marines who were “recommended and eligible” for reenlistment and 
who either reenlisted or separated.  Variable descriptions for each variable used in this 
analysis are shown in Table 3.  These descriptions represent the final merged product of 
the four datasets outlined above.  Key variables of interest will be discussed at greater 
length in the following paragraphs. 
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for first-term Marines 
Variable Name Variable 
Description 
Variable Type Range 




Binary =1 if reenlisted; 0 
otherwise 
Independent Variables    
srb_multiple SRB offered to 
eligible Marine 
Continuous 0-5 








_0_gwot_deployments No deployments iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if no 
deployments; 0 
otherwise 
_1_gwot_deployments 1 deployment iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 1 deployment; 
0 otherwise 
_2_gwot_deployments 2 deployments iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 2 
deployments; 0 
otherwise 
_3_or_more_gwot_deployments 3 or more 
deployments iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 3 or more 
deployments; 0 
otherwise 
_0_gwot_days_deployed 0 days deployed iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 0 days 
deployed; 0 
otherwise 
_1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed 1-100 days deployed 
iso OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 1-100 days 
deployed; 0 
otherwise 
_101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed 101-200 days 
deployed iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 101-200 days 
deployed; 0 
otherwise 
_201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed 201-300 days 
deployed iso 
OIF/OEF 




_301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed 301-400 days 
deployed iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if 301-400 days 
deployed; 0 
otherwise 
_more_than_400_gwot_days_deployed More than 400 days 
deployed iso 
OIF/OEF 
Binary =1 if days deployed 




mil_civ_pay_ratio Military to civilian 
pay ratio 
Continuous 1.0479-1.1126 
FY03 Fiscal year of ECC Binary =1 if ECC is in 
FY03; otherwise 
FY04 Fiscal year of ECC Binary =1 if ECC is in 
FY04; 0 otherwise 
FY05 Fiscal year of ECC Binary =1 if ECC is in 
FY05; 0 otherwise 
FY06 Fiscal year of ECC Binary =1 if ECC is in 
FY06; 0 otherwise 
FY07 Fiscal year of ECC Binary =1 if ECC is in 
FY07; 0 otherwise 
married Marital status  Binary =1 if married; 0 
otherwise 
number_dependents Number of 
dependents 
Continuous 0-10 
female Sex Binary =1 if female; 0 
otherwise 
E3 Rank Binary =1 if E3; 0 
otherwise 
E4 Rank Binary =1 if E4; 0 
otherwise 
E5 Rank Binary =1 if E5; 0 
otherwise 





Binary =1 if MOS 
indicated; 0 
otherwise 
*214 binary variables for each MOS.  Appendix A is a MOS listing with titles.  
1. Reenlistment Decisions 
 The reenlist variable is a binary variable that represents whether a Marine 
reenlisted or separated.  The dataset was restricted to only those first-term Marines who 
were recommended and eligible for reenlistment.  First-term Marines are defined by the 
Marine Corps as those Marines having “17 months to 6 years of active Marine Corps 
Service of which at least 17 months was continuous active service other than for 
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training.”30  If a Marine reenlisted during the period, he was included in the dataset as 
“1” for the reenlist variable.  If a Marine did an extension, the End of Current Contract 
(ECC) date would be changed to reflect the extension and he would be included either 
later that fiscal year or in the next fiscal year, depending on the length of the extension.  
If a Marine separated for an honorable condition, he/she was included in the dataset as a 
“0” for the reenlist variable.  If a Marine separated under non-honorable conditions, 
he/she was excluded from the dataset.   
2. Selective Reenlistment Bonuses 
The srb_multiple variable represents the Selective Reenlistment Bonus that was 
offered to a Marine during his reenlistment decision process.  SRBs are offered in .5 
increments ranging from 0 to 5.  As previously stated, SRBs are offered to Marines in 
certain Military Occupational Specialties in an attempt to boost reenlistments.  
3. Deployments to Operation Iraqi/Enduring Freedom 
Deployment information was retrieved from the GWOT database contained in the 
TFDW.  A deployment (or deployed days) is defined as any time spent in support of 
Operations Iraqi/Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF).  The Marine Corps tracks this 
information by use of a crisis remark code in their administrative system, the Marine 
Corps Total Force System (MCTFS).  This data is in two forms: total number of 
deployments and total number of days deployed during the Marine’s initial contract.   
The variable names in the dataset for these two continuous variables are 
total_gwot_deployments and total_gwot_days_deployed, respectively.  Marines in the 
dataset deployed anywhere from 0-4 times and the number of deployed days ranged from 
0-798 days.  The dataset also contains ten binary variables that were created from the two 
continuous variables.  There are four binary variables that account for how many 
deployments the Marine participated in (0, 1, 2, and 3 or more).  Additionally, there are 
six binary variables that account for the deployment tempo of a Marine, measured in days 
deployed (0, 1-100, 101-200, 201-300, 301-400, and more than 400).    
                                                 
30 Marine Corps Order 7220.24M, Subject:  Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, May 1990, 1-2. 
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This study does not include data on what is considered “normal deployments.”  
Normal deployments could represent a broad range of circumstances; ranging from 
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) to non-combat related deployments with a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  There have been several studies in the past that have 
concluded that these types of deployments have little to no affect on reenlistment 
behavior.31  Therefore, this analysis will only consider deployments in support of 
OIF/OEF. 
4. Economic Factors  
Economic factors that are hypothesized to affect reenlistment decisions include 
unemployment rates and relative military pay.  Included in the dataset are two variables 
to represent these factors: unemployment_rate and mil_civ_pay_ratio.  The 
unemployment_rate variable represents the average national unemployment rate for 20-
24 males.  This average rate was matched to each individual Marine during his 
reenlistment decision fiscal year.  The mil_civ_pay_ratio is a simple ratio of military to 
civilian pay for each fiscal year.  Military pay was calculated for each fiscal year based 
on the current basic pay that an E-4 with four years of service would receive.  This 
amount was utilized because the vast majority of Marines making reenlistment decisions 
are very close to four years of and nearly 60 percent are E-4’s.  The civilian pay was 
calculated as an annual average of the national-level usual weekly earnings for 20-24 
year old males.  For example in fiscal year 2007 an E-4 with four years of service earned 
$494.63 per week compared to the usual weekly earnings for 20-24 year old males of 
$472.  This yields a military to civilian pay ratio of 1.04.  Throughout the fiscal years in 
the dataset this rate has ranged from 1.02-1.11.    
Additionally, there are five dummy variables that account for the fiscal year in 
which the reenlistment decision was made.  Dummy variables that account for fiscal year 
could also be utilized in multivariate models to control for economic conditions, as well 
as other unobservable characteristics for a given fiscal year.   
                                                 
31 Hosek, and Kavanagh, and Miller, “How Deployments Affect Servicemembers,” xix. 
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5. Demographic Variables 
Included in the dataset are four variables that depict a particular Marine’s personal 
characteristics.  The married variable is a binary variable that represents whether a 
Marine is married or not.  The variable for number of dependents (number_dependents) is 
a continuous variable that represents how many dependents a Marine has; these values 
ranged from 0-10.  The male and female variables are dummy variables that indicate the 
sex of a Marine. 
6. Military Occupational Specialty  
The original dataset received from the TFDW included a variable for each 
Marine’s MOS.  This data was coded to represent dummy variables for each MOS for 
inclusion in the statistical models.  There are 214 dummy variables which represent all of 
the MOSs.  Appendix A is a listing of the title and number of each MOS included in the 
dataset 
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4 lays out the summary statistics for all variables included in the dataset.    
The mean value for the dependent variable is 0.30, indicating the overall reenlistment rate 
for the five-year period is right at 30 percent.  The mean value (1.16) for SRB multiple 
offers indicates that across all MOSs an average SRB multiple of just over one was 
offered.  Marines averaged just over one (1.13) deployment in support of Operations 
Iraqi/Enduring Freedom.  Additionally, Marines averaged 166.7 days deployed in support 
of OIF/OEF.  The mean unemployment rate for the five year period was 9.6 percent and 
the mean military-to-civilian pay ratio was 1.08.  The sample is evenly distributed among 
the five fiscal years with roughly 20 percent from each fiscal year.  Nearly 46 percent of 
the Marines in the dataset are married.  The mean number of dependents is .68.  Male 
Marines make up 94 percent of the dataset.  The majority of Marines in the dataset are E-
4s (59 percent), while E-3s make up 10 percent, E-5s make up 30 percent, and E-6s are 
less than one percent of the dataset (.002). 
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Table 4.   Summary Statistics for First-Term Marines 
    Variable                 |      Obs       Mean       Std. Dev.      
Dependent Variable 
    reenlist                 |    105371    .303537      .4597872        
Independent Variables 
srb_multiple                 |    105371    1.157429     1.328291        
Total gwot_deployments       |    105371    1.134325    1.060792        
total_gwot~days_deployed     |    105371    166.7071     163.596         
_0_gwot_deployments          |    105371    .3469645    .4760066        
_1_gwot_deployment           |    105371    .3066214     .461093         
_2_gwot_deployments          |    105371    .2341916    .4234945        
_3_or_more_gwot_deployments  |    105371    .1122225    .3156415        
_0_gwot_days_deployed        |    105371    .3469645    .4760066        
_1_to_100_days_deployed      |    105371    .0555656     .2290819        
_101_to_200_days_deployed    |    105371    .212345      .4089696       
_201_to_300_days_deployed    |    105371    .1591614    .3658283        
_301_to_400_days_deployed    |    105371    .1158763     .320078         
more_than_400_days_deployed  |    105371    .1100872    .3129999        
Unemployment_rate            |    105371    9.614936     .7340741       
mil_civ_pay_ratio            |    105371    1.08487      .0261408      
        FY03                 |    105371    .1829346    .3866147        
        FY04                 |    105371    .2137305    .4099407        
        FY05                 |    105371    .2005201    .4003914        
        FY06                 |    105371    .2019056    .4014241        
        FY07                 |    105371    .2009092    .4006822        
     married                 |    105371    .4560743    .4980692        
number_dependents            |    105371    .684771     .9284723        
        male                 |    105371    .9385979    .2400675        
      female                 |    105371    .0614021    .2400675        
          E3                 |    105371    .1015555    .3020643        
          E4                 |    105371    .595382     .4908203        
          E5                 |    105371    .3008228     .458618         
          E6                 |    105371    .0022397    .0472727        
1. Reenlistment Decisions 
Reenlistment rates for first-term Marines have fluctuated during the post-9/11 
period.  Figure 6 describes overall first-term reenlistment rates by fiscal year.  These 
fluctuations in reenlistment rates are hypothesized to be attributed to several factors: 
¾ Prior to the initial deployments to Iraq in fiscal year 2003 many Marines 
were involuntarily extended to carry out deployments. 
¾ Many Marines joined the Marine Corps to “deploy and fight.”  The start of 
OIF could have increased esprit de corps and the desire to be a part of the 
war. 
¾ The authorized increase in total end-strength to 202,000 Marines. 
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¾ A $10,000 reenlistment incentive was given to all Marines, regardless of 


























Figure 6.   Reenlistment Rates by Fiscal Year 
 
The data shows that reenlistment rates also vary widely by rank.  As could be 
expected, Marines in higher ranks reenlist at considerably higher rates than those in lower 
ranks.  A Marine’s motivation and desire for success is hypothesized to have a direct 
impact on the rank in which he/she attains.  A Marine that has a greater taste for “staying 
Marine” will likely strive to attain higher physical fitness scores, higher proficiency and 
conduct marks, and higher rifle qualifications, all which contribute to a Marine getting 
promoted to the next rank.  Figure 7 highlights the difference in reenlistment rates for 
first-term Marines of different ranks.  Nearly 90 percent of Marines in the dataset were 

































Figure 7.   Reenlistment Rates by Rank 
 
2. Selective Reenlistment Bonus Offers 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus offers have drastically increased since the onset of 
the Long War.  The average SRB multiple offer for fiscal year 2006 was less than 1.0, 
whereas by fiscal year 2007 it had risen to nearly 2.0.  This increase can be attributed to 
two factors; the increase in end-strength to 202,000 Marines, and the strain of the 
increased deployment tempo placed on our Marines.  Figure 8 displays the average SRB 
multiple offers to all first-term Marines for each fiscal year. 
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Figure 8.   Average SRB Offers by Fiscal Year 
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3. Marital Status 
Most Marines enter the Marine Corps single; however, by the time they make 
their first reenlistment decision nearly half of them (46 percent) are married.  Previous 
studies have highlighted the fact that married Marines reenlist at higher rates than do their 
single counterparts.32  This fact holds true for this study as well.  Figure 9 highlights the 
differences in reenlistment rates based on marital status and shows that reenlistment rates 













Married Single   
Figure 9.   Reenlistment Rates by Marital Status 
 
4. Economic Factors 
Economic conditions have seen some variation throughout the time period being 
analyzed.  National unemployment rates for 20-24 year old males have ranged from a 
high of 11.9 percent in July 2003 to a low of 8 percent in June 2006, with an average rate 
of 9.6 percent.  The military to civilian pay ratio has also seen some variation.  This ratio 
was at a low of 1.04 in 2007 and saw a high of 1.11 in 2006. 
                                                 
32 Hattiangadi, and Shuford, and Quester, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post-9/11 Era:  The Effects 
of Deployment Tempo on Marines With and Without Dependents,” 9-14. 
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5. Deployments to Operation Iraqi/Enduring Freedom 
 As a result of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines have been 
deploying more often and for a longer duration.  Figure 10 displays the percentage of 

































Figure 10.   Percent of First-Term Marines Deployed to OIF/OEF 
 
Not only has the sheer number of Marines deploying increased, but also the 
amount of time, in number of days, a Marine deploys has increased significantly.  Figure 
11 below shows that the average number of days a Marine deployed to OIF/OEF has 
risen drastically over time.  In fiscal year 2003, the average number of days deployed to 
OIF/OEF for all first-term Marines in the dataset was 58 days.  In contrast, the average 
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Figure 11.   Average Number of Deployed Days by Fiscal Year 
 Similar to previous studies, this study also finds that single Marines deploy more 
frequently than do their married counterparts.  As shown in Figure 12 below, 






















Figure 12.   Average Number of Deployed Days by Marital Status and Fiscal Year 
 Reenlistment rates as a function of deployed days also shows the negative impact 
of deployment on reenlistment decisions.  First-term Marines who did not deploy to Iraq 
or Afghanistan or spent very little time deployed (1-100 days) have significantly higher 
reenlistment rates than first-term Marines with more deployed time.  Interestingly, 
reenlistment rates for Marines who deployed 101 days or more are relatively flat as days 
deployed increases.  Figure 13 highlights reenlistment rates as a function of total days 

























Figure 13.   Reenlistment Rates by Number of Days Deployed to OIF/OEF 
6. Military Occupational Specialty Reenlistment Rates 
Reenlistment rates vary widely among the different Military Occupational 
Specialties.  Table 5 highlights the average reenlistment rate for several high density 
MOSs and MOSs with exceptionally high or low reenlistment rates over the five-year 
period. 
Table 5.   Reenlistment Rates for Selected Military Occupational Specialties 
MOS MOS Title  Reenlistment Rate 
High Density MOSs 
0121 Personnel Clerk 0.3780 
0151 Administrative Clerk 0.4774 
0311 Rifleman 0.2321 
0331 Machine Gunner 0.2406 
0341 Mortarman 0.2179 
3043 Supply Administration and Operations Specialist 0.4182 
3051 Warehouse Clerk 0.3429 
0621 Field Radio Operator 0.2987 
3531 Motor Vehicle Operator 0.3116 
5811 Military Police 0.2868 
6046 Aircraft Maintenance Administrative Specialist 0.4078 
Exceptionally High Reenlistment Rate MOSs 
2336 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician 0.7778 
4066 Small Computer Systems Specialist 0.9357 
6232 Fixed Wing Aircraft Flight Mechanic, KC-130 0.7500 
6335 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician 0.9167 
Exceptionally Low Reenlistment Rate MOSs 
0622 Digital Wideband Transmission Equipment Operator 0.1856 
0626 Fleet SATCOM Terminal Operator 0.0952 
5939 Aviation Communications System Technician 0.1818 




Because of the binary nature of the reenlistment decision, a logistic regression 
model is specified to estimate the predictive effect of SRBs on the probability of first-
term reenlistment by MOS.  Due to the model being a prediction model for probabilities, 
the outcomes need to be limited to between zero and one; therefore, the functional form 
must be nonlinear.   
The Marine Corps is looking for an easily updatable model that can be recreated 
each fiscal year, if needed.  Therefore, the final model specification will only include 
those independent variables that can be easily obtained or that can be estimated for each 
year.  This study will explore four separate logistic regression models in an attempt to get 
the true effect of SRB offers on reenlistment decisions.  Table 6 displays the variables 
included in the four logistic regression estimates. 
 
Table 6.   Logistic Model Variables   
Model #1  Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 
    
reenlist reenlist reenlist reenlist 
    
srb_multiple srb_multiple srb_multiple srb_multiple 
_0_gwot_days_deployed _0_gwot_days_deployed _0_gwot_days_deployed - 
_1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed _1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed _1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed - 
_101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed _101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed _101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed - 
_201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed _201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed _201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed - 
_301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed _301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed _301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed - 
_more_than_400_days_deployed _more_than_400_days_deployed _more_than_400_days_deployed - 
FY04 FY04 - - 
FY05 FY05 - - 
FY06 FY06 - - 
FY07 FY07 - - 
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- - unemployment_rate unemployment_rate 
- - mil_civ_pay_ratio mil_civ_pay_ratio 
married - - - 
female - - - 
E4 - - - 
E5 - - - 
E6 - - - 
mos_* mos_* mos_* mos_* 
* - All models will include all 214 dummy variables for MOS as independent variables. 
The generic logit model specification is shown in the equation below: 
1 1( /(1 )) ... k kLN P P x xα β β− = +  
where P is the probability of reenlisting, and LN  is the natural logarithm.  The estimated 
coefficients, 1β  through kβ  must be converted to obtain the predicted changes in 
probability given the independent variables 1x through kx  (called the marginal effect). 
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IV. MULTIVARIATE MODEL RESULTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will present the multivariate results for the four logit regression 
models that estimate the predictive effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) offers 
on reenlistment.  This chapter will present the results for the key independent variables.  
Appendix B contains the complete logit regression results for all four models.  The 
results of the logit regressions for each model are used to determine the predicted 
reenlistment rates by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  Reenlistment rates will be 
predicted for fiscal year 2008 using each of the four models.  
B. MODEL #1: FULLY-SPECIFIED REENLISTMENT MODEL WITH 
DEPLOYMENT DATA 
This model is the most fully-specified of the four logit regression models due to 
the inclusion of the most explanatory control variables.  The dependent variable in this 
model individual reenlistment decision, measured as a binary variable (yes, no).  The 
explanatory variables include SRB multiple offered, deployment days served, fiscal year 
dummies, marital status, gender, rank, and dummies for MOS.  It is hypothesized that all 
of the explanatory variables affect whether or not a Marine chooses to reenlist.  There are 
likely many other factors that influence a Marine’s decision to reenlist; however, in 
keeping with the goal of developing a parsimonious, yet accurate, model these 




6 7 8 9 10
( /(1 )) _ 1 100 _ _ 101 200 _
_ 201 300 _ _ 301 400 _ _
_ 400 _ _ 04 05 06
LN P P srb multiple to gwot days deployed to gwot
days deployed to gwot days deployed to gwot days deployed
more than gwot days deployed FY FY FY
α β β β
β β
β β β β β
− = + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
11 12 13 14 15 16
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4 5 6 i i
FY
married female E E E mosβ β β β β β
+
+ + + + +∑
 
The results of estimating this model are presented in Table 7.  The primary logit 
coefficient estimates are displayed along with the derivative, or marginal effects, which 
were calculated at the mean reenlistment rate. Overall, the estimation model fits the data 
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well.  All of the explanatory variables are individually significant, and the large chi-
square value (7798.44) indicates joint statistical significance of all variables in the model.   
Table 7.   Logit Reenlistment Model (#1) 
Model 1 Logit 
Coefficients 
Marginal Effects 
srb_multiple 0.11600 .0240 
 (0.01134)***  
_1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed -0.09003 -.0186 
 (0.03155)***  
_101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed -0.40787 -.0845 
 (0.02015)***  
_201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed -0.37492 -.0776 
 (0.02280)***  
_301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed -0.40938 -.0848 
 (0.02632)***  
more_than_400_gwot_days_deployed -0.33070 -.0685 
 (0.02765)***  
FY04 0.63848 .1322 
 (0.02322)***  
FY05 0.55789 .1155 
 (0.02444)***  
FY06 0.42581 .0882 
 (0.02644)***  
FY07 0.47270 .0979 
 (0.02742)***  
married 0.65306 .1353 
 (0.01406)***  
female -0.21988 -.0455 
 (0.02941)***  
E4 0.77123 .1597 
 (0.02789)***  
E5 0.97482 .2019 
 (0.02973)***  
E6 1.27231 .2635 
 (0.15563)***  
mos_* (214 Binary Variables) yes a   
Observations 105371  
Constant -2.659729  
Log Likelihood -60780.819  
Chi-square 7798.44  
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
  
        a Coefficients displayed in Appendix B 
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1. Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses 
The effect the SRB multiple on reenlistments is positive and statistically 
significant.  The marginal effect of SRB multiple on reenlistment decisions is 2.4 
percentage points, or 8.3 percent.  This value indicates that a one-unit increase in the SRB 
multiple would increase the reenlistment rate by 8.3 percent, holding all other variables 
constant and at their mean value.  At the mean value, this means the reenlistment rate 
overall would rise from .2905 to .3146 with a one-level increase in the SRB multiple for 
the Marine Corps as a whole.  
2. Effects of Deployment Tempo 
The effects of the length of prior deployments on reenlistments are negative and 
statistically significant, compared to no deployments.  Also, the size of the deployment 
effect increases with the length of deployment.  The marginal effects of deployed days on 
reenlistment decisions ranges from -1.86 percentage points (1-100 days deployed) to -
8.48 percentage points (301-400 days deployed), relative to not deploying at all.  These 
values indicate that Marines deploying in support of Operations Iraqi/Enduring Freedom 
are less likely to reenlist by between 6.4 and 29.2 percent, holding all other variables 
constant and at their mean values.  Thus, a one-level SRB increase would be sufficient to 
offset the negative reenlistment effect of deploying between 1 and 100 days, but would 
not be adequate to offset the negative reenlistment effect of longer deployments. 
3. Effects of Fiscal Year Controls  
Fiscal year dummy variables are included in the model as controls for civilian 
labor market conditions and other unobservable factors that change over time and that 
might effect reenlistments.  One example would be the $10,000 reenlistment bonus that 
was given to all Marines during fiscal years 2006 and 2007.  It is hypothesized that this 
bonus would increase reenlistment behavior across the board, thus making the controls 
for fiscal years important in estimating the independent effect of targeted SRB offers and 




statistically significant relative to fiscal year 2003.  However, the estimated coefficients 
are larger for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 than for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, as would be 
expected. 
4. Effects of Demographic Variables 
The retention effect of being married is positive and statistically significant.  The 
marginal effect of being of married on reenlistment decisions is 13.53 percentage points, 
or 46.6 percent.  This value indicates that being married increases the probability of 
reenlistment by 46.6 percent, holding all other variables constant and at their mean 
values.  The magnitude of this effect is quite large.  The effects of gender are also 
statistically significant.  Female Marines are 4.55 percentage points, or 15.7 percent, less 
likely to reenlist than males, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.   
5. Effects of Rank  
The effect of rank on reenlistment decisions is statistically significant.  All of the 
higher ranks (E-4, E-5, and E-6) display positive marginal effects when compared to E-
3’s.  As hypothesized, as a Marine gains more rank, his likelihood of reenlistment 
increases.  This is displayed in the marginal effects of the dummy variables for E-4, E-5, 
and E6.  These values indicate that first-term Marines making reenlistment decisions who 
are in the grades of E-4, E-5, and E-6 are more likely to reenlist than E-3s by 15.97, 
20.19, and 26.35 percentage points, respectively, all else equal.  The speed of 
advancement is an important prediction of retention behavior. 
C. MODEL #2: REENLISTMENT MODEL WITH DEPLOYMENT DATA 
BUT WITHOUT RANK, GENDER, AND MARITAL STATUS 
This model is very similar to the first model, except it omits marital status, 
gender, and rank.  These variables are omitted to examine how coefficient of the SRB 
multiple changes compared to the first model.  Omitting these three variables would 
eliminate potentially unneeded data collection by the Marine Corps SRB Planner.   
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This model was developed to provide a more simplified version of Model #1, 
while still controlling for key explanatory variables.  The actual model specification is:  
1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9 10
( /(1 )) _ 1 100 _ _ 101 200 _
_ 201 300 _ _ 301 400 _ _
_ 400 _ _ 04 05 06
LN P P srb multiple to gwot days deployed to gwot
days deployed to gwot days deployed to gwot days deployed
more than gwot days deployed FY FY FY
α β β β
β β
β β β β β
− = + + +
+ + +
+ + + + 1107 i iFY mosβ+∑
 
The results of this model specification are presented in Table 8.  Displayed are the 
logit coefficient estimates along with the derivative, or marginal effects, which are 
calculated at the mean reenlistment rate.  As with Model #1, this specification fits the 
data well and displays overall strong statistical significance as demonstrated by the chi-
square value of 4374.18.  However, the goodness of fit is not as strong as with Model #1. 
 46
Table 8.   Logit Reenlistment Model (#2) – Deletes Rank, Gender, and Marital 
Status  




srb_multiple 0.10571 .0221 
 (0.01116)***  
_1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed -0.06732 -.0141 
 (0.03099)**  
_101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed -0.39180 -.0821 
 (0.01975)***  
_201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed -0.39048 -.0818 
 (0.02233)***  
_301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed -0.41609 -.0872 
 (0.02578)***  
more_than_400_gwot_days_deployed -0.36684 -.0769 
 (0.02708)***  
FY04 0.61900 .1297 
 (0.02283)***  
FY05 0.53888 .1129 
 (0.02401)***  
FY06 0.44807 .0939 
 (0.02600)***  
FY07 0.51853 .1086 
 (0.02696)***  
mos_* (214 Binary Variables) yes a   
Observations 105371  
Constant -1.638342  
Log Likelihood -62492.948  
Chi-square 4374.18  
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
  
              a Coefficients displayed in Appendix B 
1. Effects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Multiple 
The effect of SRB offers on reenlistments is positive and statistically significant 
in Model #2.  The marginal effect of SRB offers on reenlistment decisions is 2.21 
percentage points, or 7.6 percent.  The estimation results are very similar to that found in 
Model #1 (2.4 percentage points), with less than one-half of a percent difference in the 
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in SRB. 
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2. Effects of Deployment Tempo 
The effect of deployment tempo on reenlistments is negative and statistically 
significant.  The marginal effects of deployed days on reenlistment decisions ranges from 
-1.41 percentage points (1-100 days deployed) to -8.72 percentage points (301-400 days 
deployed), relative to not deploying at all.  These values indicate that Marines deploying 
in support of Operations Iraqi/Enduring Freedom anywhere from 4.9 to 30.0 percent less 
likely to reenlist, holding all other variables constant and at their mean value.  As with 
SRB offers, the marginal effects of deployment tempo for Model #2 are similar to those 
found in Model #1.  The differences in coefficients range from -.0045 (1-100 days 
deployed) to .0084 (more than 400 days deployed). 
3. Effects of Fiscal Year Controls 
Similar to Model #1, fiscal year dummy variables were included in Model #2 as 
controls for economic conditions and other unobservable conditions that might be present 
from year to year.  As was the case in Model #1, all fiscal year dummy variables (2004-
2007) are positive and statistically significant relative to fiscal year 2003.  However, the 
coefficient estimates are larger than in Model #1, which is likely due to the omission of 
marital status, gender, and rank in Model #2. 
D. MODEL #3:  REENLISTMENT MODEL WITH DEPLOYMENT DATA 
INCLUDING NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND MILITARY-
CIVILIAN PAY RATIOS 
Model #3 utilizes a different approach than in Models #1 or #2.  Explanatory 
variables for the SRB multiple, deployment tempo, and MOS are included; however, 
fiscal year dummy variables are replaced with variables for the national unemployment 
rate and the military-to-civilian pay ratio.  Both of these variables are measured on an 
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The results of this model specification are presented in Table 9.  Displayed are the 
logit coefficients along with the derivative, or marginal effects, which are calculated at 
the mean reenlistment rate.  As was the case with the previous two models, this 
estimation model also fits the data quite well.  The chi-square of 3693.37 highlights the 
strong statistical significance of the overall model. 
Table 9.   Logit Reenlistment Model (#3) – Including National Unemployment Rate 
and Military-Civilian Pay Ratio 




srb_multiple 0.10218 .0215 
 (0.01109)***  
_1_to_100_gwot_days_deployed -0.01980 -.0042 
 (0.03079)  
_101_to_200_gwot_days_deployed -0.34408 -.0722 
 (0.01956)***  
_201_to_300_gwot_days_deployed -0.33910 -.0712 
 (0.02221)***  
_301_to_400_gwot_days_deployed -0.37575 -.0789 
 (0.02572)***  
more_than_400_gwot_days_deployed -0.33166 -.0696 
 (0.02703)***  
unemployment_rate -0.09238 -.0194 
 (0.01193)***  
mil_civ_pay_ratio 2.53602 .5325 
 (0.26340)***  
mos_* (214 Binary Variables) yes a   
Observations 105371  
Constant -3.090534  
Log Likelihood -62833.353  
Chi-square 3693.37  
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
  
          a Coefficients displayed in Appendix B 
1. Effects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Multiple 
The effect of the SRB multiple on reenlistments is positive and statistically 
significant.  The marginal effect of SRB on reenlistment decisions is 2.15 percentage 
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points, or 7.4 percent.  The magnitude of the SRB effect is very similar to those found in 
the two previous models, with less than a one percent difference in the size of the 
marginal effect. 
2. Effects of Deployment Tempo 
The effect of deployment tempo on reenlistments is negative and statistically 
significant for all deployment variables. The lone exception is the coefficient for 
deployments of 1-100 days, which is insignificant.  The marginal effects of deployed 
days on reenlistment decisions ranges from -.42 percentage points (1-100 days deployed) 
to -7.89 percentage points  (301-400 days deployed), relative to not deploying at all.  
These values indicate that Marines deploying in support of Operations Iraqi/Enduring 
Freedom are less likely to reenlist by anywhere from 1.5 to 27.2 percent, holding all other 
variables constant and at their mean value. However, the (1-100 days deployed) variable 
is not statistically significant at any acceptable level.   
3. Effects of Economic Variables 
The effect of national-level unemployment rates for 20 to24-year old males on 
reenlistment is negative and statistically significant.  The marginal effect of 
unemployment rates on reenlistment decisions is 1.94 percentage points, indicating a 1 
percentage point increase in national unemployment rates decreases reenlistments by 1.94 
percentage points, holding all other variables constant at their mean value.  This finding 
is not consistent with previous studies of reenlistment, nor with economic theory.  
Several previous studies have found that higher unemployment rates are associated with 
higher reenlistment rates.33  One possible explanation for the negative effect is that it is 
due to the lack of variation in the national level unemployment rate for 20 to 24-year-old 
males during the time period analyzed.  Another explanation is that the national 
unemployment rate is not a good proxy for the actual unemployment, perhaps at the local 
level, that affects individuals' reenlistment decision. 
                                                 
33 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
31. 
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The effect of military pay relative to civilian pay on reenlistments is positive and 
statistically significant, as expected.  The marginal effect of the military-to-civilian pay 
ratio is .53 percentage points, indicating that a one percentage point increase in the 
military-to- civilian pay ratio results in a .53 percentage point increase in reenlistments.  
This finding is in line with previous studies that have found that higher levels of relative 
military pay lead to higher reenlistments.34 
E. MODEL #4:  REENLISTMENT MODEL WITHOUT DEPLOYMENT 
VARIABLES 
Model #4 was created to analyze the predictive ability of a model that omits 
controls for prior deployment tempo.  Model #4 mirrors the specification in Model #3 
with the exception of the omission of controls for deployment tempo.  The estimated 
effects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus multiple will be compared to those in Model 
#3 to assess the need for incorporating deployment data in the overall model.  The actual 
model specification is: 
1 2
3 4
( /(1 )) _ _
_ _ _ i i
LN P P srb multiple unemploy rate
mil civ pay ratio mos
α β β
β β
− = + +
+ +∑  
The results of estimating Model #4 are presented in Table 10.  Displayed are the 
logit coefficients along with the derivatives, or marginal effects, which were calculated at 
the mean reenlistment rate.  Similar to the previous three models, this estimation model 







                                                 
34 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
31. 
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Table 10.   Logit Reenlistment Model (#4) – Omitting Deployment Tempo 




 Reenlist  
srb_multiple 0.09624 .0202 
 (0.01100)***  
unemployment_rate -0.02401 -.0051 
 (0.01103)**  
mil_civ_pay_ratio 2.14039 .4501 
 (0.26152)***  
mos_* (214 Binary Variables) yes a   
Observations 105371  
Constant -3.551835  
Log Likelihood -63080.446  
Chi-square 3199.18  
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
  
        a Coefficients displayed in Appendix B 
 
1. Effects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Multiple 
As with Model #3, the effects of the SRB multiple is positive and statistically 
significant.  The marginal effect of the SRB multiple on reenlistment decisions is 2.02 
percentage points, or 6.95 percent.  This effect is considerably smaller than those found 
in previous studies.35  The North study found that the marginal effect of SRB offers on 
reenlistment decisions was 7.1 percentage points, or 27.6 percent.  In comparison to 
Model #3, the SRB marginal effect is .13 percentage points, or .45 percent, lower.  This 
indicates that for a one-unit increase in SRB offers the reenlistment rate would be .45 
percent lower using Model #4 vice Model #3, holding all other variables constant at their 
mean value.  This difference may seem small, but it is highly significant.  When using 
models #3 and #4 to predict reenlistment rates for a given MOS, the predicted 
reenlistment rates vary by 1 to 9 percent, depending on MOS and SRB multiple.  For 
                                                 
35 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
28. 
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example, the predicted reenlistment rates for Ammunition Technicians (MOS 2311) at an 
SRB multiple of 4 is 39 percent under Model #3 and 42 percent under Model #4.  Using 
the model that omits deployment data could over-predict reenlistment rates and under-
retain Marines to the desired manning levels.  There is a clear difference in models when 
deployment tempo is included in the estimation model. 
2. Effects of Economic Variables 
The effect of the 20-24 year old male national-level unemployment rate on 
reenlistment continues to be negative, which is inconsistent with previous literature.  The 
marginal effect of unemployment rates on reenlistment decisions is -.005 percentage 
points, which is consistent with the results found in Model #3.  The effect of military pay 
relative to civilian pay on reenlistments is positive and statistically significant.  The 
marginal effect of the military-to-civilian pay ratio is .45 percentage points, indicating 
that a one percentage point increase in the ratio results in a .45 percentage point increase 
in reenlistments.  This result is similar to that found in Model #3.  Previous studies of 
reenlistment found the marginal effect of military-to-civilian pay to be .20 percentage 
points.36  
F. PREDICTION MODEL 
The results from the four logit models are used to predict the probability of 
reenlistment by Military Occupational Specialty for fiscal year 2008.  The predicted 
reenlistment probabilities are constructed using the logit coefficients and some basic 
assumptions about values of the explanatory variables for fiscal year 2008.  Predicted 
reenlistment rates for fiscal year 2008 for several high density MOSs are presented in 
Table 11.  A comprehensive listing of predicted reenlistment rates for all MOSs is 
contained in Appendix C.  Additionally, four separate Microsoft Excel spreadsheets are 
developed to assist manpower planners to calculate predicted reenlistment rates.  
Screenshots from each of these models are contained in Appendix D.
                                                 





Table 11.   Predicted Fiscal Year 2008 Reenlistment Rates for High-Density MOSs 
  
SRB Multiple of 0 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 1 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 2 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 3 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 4 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 5 
Model # 
MOS  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
0121  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.36  0.38 0.37 0.33 0.39  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.41  0.43 0.42 0.38 0.43  0.46 0.45 0.41 0.46  0.49 0.48 0.43 0.48
0151  0.46 0.45 0.41 0.46  0.49 0.48 0.43 0.49  0.52 0.50 0.46 0.51  0.55 0.53 0.48 0.54  0.57 0.56 0.51 0.56  0.60 0.58 0.54 0.58
0311  0.20 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.21 0.21 0.18 0.19  0.24 0.23 0.20 0.21  0.26 0.25 0.21 0.23  0.28 0.27 0.23 0.24  0.30 0.29 0.25 0.26
0331  0.20 0.20 0.18 0.19  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.24  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.31 0.30 0.26 0.27
0341  0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17  0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25
0621  0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.30 0.30 0.27 0.28  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.30  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.37 0.38 0.33 0.35  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.37
3043  0.41 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.44 0.43 0.39 0.43  0.47 0.46 0.42 0.45  0.49 0.49 0.44 0.48  0.52 0.51 0.47 0.50  0.55 0.54 0.49 0.52
3051  0.35 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.37 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.40 0.39 0.34 0.37  0.43 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.46 0.44 0.39 0.42  0.49 0.47 0.42 0.44
3531  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.34  0.38 0.38 0.34 0.36  0.41 0.41 0.36 0.38  0.44 0.43 0.39 0.41
5811  0.24 0.25 0.22 0.26  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.28  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.37 0.37 0.32 0.36
6046  0.36 0.38 0.34 0.37  0.38 0.40 0.36 0.40  0.41 0.43 0.38 0.42  0.44 0.45 0.41 0.44  0.47 0.48 0.43 0.47  0.50 0.51 0.46 0.49
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1. Model #1 and Model #2 Assumptions 
In developing the predicted reenlistment rates by MOS, several assumptions are 
made for the independent variables.  It is hypothesized that fiscal year 2008 would be 
more like fiscal year 2007 than any other fiscal year in the sample.  For this reason, and 
due to lack of availability of data for fiscal year 2008, the average values for fiscal year 
2007 for deployed days, percent married, percent female, and rank distribution were used 
to calculate the predicted reenlistment rates for fiscal year 2008.  The difference between 
Model #1 and Model #2 is that married, female, and rank are omitted in model #2.  
Appendix D contains several screenshots from the Microsoft Excel Models which 
demonstrates these assumptions. 
2. Model #3 and Model #4 Assumptions 
Similar assumptions to those made for Models #1 and #2 are made in constructing 
the predicted reenlistment rates for Models #3 and #4.  Average deployment days for 
fiscal year 2007 are utilized in the prediction models.  However, actual unemployment 
rates for 2008 and military-to-civilian pay ratios for 20-24 year old males at the national 
level are used.37  This data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Appendix 
D contains several screenshots from the Microsoft Excel Model which demonstrate these 
assumptions. 
3. Fiscal Year 2008 Prediction Results 
The predicted fiscal year 2008 reenlistment rates for several high density MOSs 
are contained in Table 11.  For each of the MOSs, the model specifications in columns 1-
4 clearly change the predicted reenlistment rate.  For example, MOS 0311 (rifleman) 




                                                 
37 The Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Searchable Database,” https://data.bls.gov (accessed 20 October 
2008). 
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#1 compared to a rate of .23 for model #4 with the same SRB multiple.  These results are 
comparable with previous studies.38  The North study predicted reenlistment rates for the 
Infantry occupational field to be .268 for a SRB multiple of 3.0.   
 G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the multivariate results for the four logit regression 
models developed to estimate the predictive effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
offers on reenlistment decisions.  It also developed and presented predicted reenlistment 
rates for fiscal year 2008 based on the four logit model specifications.  The results clearly 
show that SRB offers are a positive and statistically significant indicator of increased 
reenlistments.  Additionally, the results show that deployments to Operations 
Iraqi/Enduring Freedom have a negative and statistically significant effect on 




                                                 
38 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
34-35. 
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V. VALIDATION AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will validate the results of the multivariate logit models in Chapter 
IV.  The validation is done by estimating the logit reenlistment model using data for 
fiscal years 2003 through 2006. The coefficients from this model are then used to predict 
reenlistment rates by Military Occupational Specialty for fiscal year 2007 (which is the 
"hold out" sample).  The predicted rates for 2007 are then compared to the actual fiscal 
year 2007 reenlistment rates and the percent prediction error is calculated.  Model #1 
from Chapter IV of this thesis was chosen to conduct the validation because it displayed 
the highest predictive ability compared to the other three models.     
B. VALIDATION REENLISTMENT MODEL  
Model #1 was chosen for the validation exercise because it is the most fully 
specified of the four logit regression models.  The only difference between the validation 
model and Model #1 from Chapter IV is that the validation model was estimated using 
data for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 rather than the full data set for fiscal years 2003 
through 2007.  Fiscal year 2007 data constitutes the "hold out" sample.  Deleting 
observations for 2007 reduced the total observations to 84,191.  The dependent variable 
in this model is the binary reenlistment variable.  The explanatory variables include SRB 
multiple offered, deployment days, and dummies for fiscal year, marital status, gender, 
rank, and MOS.  As with Model #1 from Chapter IV, it is hypothesized that all of the 
explanatory variables affect whether or not a Marine chooses to reenlist.  The actual 
model specification is:    
1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9 10
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The results of estimating the model (using data for 2003-2006) are presented in 
Table 12.  The primary logit coefficient estimates are displayed.  Overall, the estimation 
model fits the data well indicated by the large chi-square value of 6,909.58.  Complete 
model results are contained in Appendix E.  The results from the validation model are 
similar to the Model #1, which included fiscal year 2007 data.  All coefficient estimates 
are similar, in both direction and magnitude.  As expected, because of more observations, 
the chi-square value for Model #1 is larger than the validation model, 7798.44 vice 
6909.58.  This model will be utilized to predict fiscal year 2007 reenlistment rates by 
MOS in order to determine the predictive accuracy and usability of the models in Chapter 
IV.  
Table 12.   Logit Validation Reenlistment Model, Estimated Using Data for FY 2003-
2006 






























mos_* (214 Binary Variables) yes a  
Observations 84,191 
Constant -2.66767 
Log Likelihood -48,027.501 
Chi-square 6,909.58 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
 
                a Coefficients displayed in Appendix E 
 
C. FISCAL YEAR 2007 PREDICTION RESULTS 
1. Predictions Using USMC-Wide Mean FY07 Values for the 
Explanatory Variables 
The first of the two methods utilized to predict fiscal year 2007 reenlistment by 
MOS is done by using the coefficient estimates from the validation reenlistment model 
and the average values for the explanatory variables for the entire Marine Corps.  These 
average values were easily computed since the original dataset contained detailed 
information on those Marines reenlisting in fiscal year 2007.  The reenlistment prediction 
for each MOS is calculated using the results from validation logit model.  Each MOS 
prediction was calculated in the following manner.  In the equation below the example of 
MOS 0341 is used.  The calculation yields a predicted reenlistment probability of 26 





 ( 2.66767(1)) (.1479(4)) ( .18529(.0217)) ( .50(.1305)) ( .4548(.1981))





= − + + − + − + −
+ − + − + + + +
+ − + 0(.5838)) (1.097(.33)) (1.24511(.0014) ( .1247(1))
.26




Table 13 describes the mean values used for each explanatory variable ( X ), and the logit 
coefficients ( β ) used to determine the predicted reenlistment probability, P (as in the 
equation above). 
Table 13.   Prediction Values Used in USMC Average Predictions for MOS 0341 
Variable Logit Coefficient (β ) Value Used ( X ) 
Constant -2.6676 1 in all models 
SRB Multiple .1479 Actual SRB offered in FY07 for each 
MOS (4.0 for MOS 0341 in the 
example) 
1-100 days deployed -.18529 USMC wide average for FY07 (.02168 
for all MOS predictions)  
101-200 days deployed -.500 USMC wide average for FY07 (.1305 
for all MOS predictions) 
201-300 days deployed -.4548 USMC wide average for FY07 (.1981 
for all MOS predictions) 
301-400 days deployed -.5161 USMC wide average for FY07 (.1931 
for all MOS predictions) 
>400 days deployed -.4655 USMC wide average for FY07 (.2527 
for all MOS predictions) 
FY06 .4475 1 For all MOS Predictions (FY07 is 
more like FY06 than any other FY in the 
sample39 
Married .63907 USMC wide average for FY07 (.469296 
for all MOS predictions) 
                                                 
39 An alternative method often used in forecasting models is to include a time-series variable that 
captures changes over time.  This method would have assigned a sequential numeric value for each FY in 
the sample (1 for FY03, 2 for FY04, etc.).  The prediction estimation would then be computed using the 
next sequential number (6 for FY07 in the MOS 0341 example). 
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Female -.28433 USMC wide average for FY07 (.060 for 
all MOS predictions) 
E4 .787 USMC wide average for FY07 (.5838 
for all MOS predictions) 
E5 1.0197 USMC wide average for FY07 (.33 for 
all MOS predictions) 
E6 1.24511 USMC wide average for FY07 (.001 for 
all MOS predictions) 
MOS dummies -.1247 (for 0341) varies 
by MOS 
=1 for the MOS being predicted; 0 for 
all others 
The results from the predictions are only moderately accurate.  The average 
percent error for all MOSs in the sample is .32.   
 
The average percent error is derived using the following formula: 
Average Percent Error = ((predicted reenlistment rate – actual reenlistment rate) / (actual 
reenlistment rate))   
Appendix F contains the predicted reenlistment rates for all MOSs compared to 
the actual fiscal year 2007 reenlistment rate.   
Because many MOSs have a small sample size, a second method for assessing 
predictive accuracy is to examine only high-density MOSs.  There are 27 MOSs that this 
thesis defines as high-density MOSs.  These 27 MOSs make up 60.57 percent of Marines 
making first term reenlistment decisions in fiscal year 2007.  Additionally, individually, 
each of the 27 MOSs makes up at least 1 percent of the total sample.  When examining 
the predictive ability of the model using these 27 MOSs, the predictions are much more 
accurate based on the prediction error.  Table 15 displays the prediction results and 
percent prediction error for these high-density MOSs.  The overall average percent error 
is reduced to .149, and 9 of the 27 MOSs predictions are within .10 of the actual fiscal 
year 2007 reenlistment rate.   
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2. Predictions Using Mean Values for X for Each MOS 
The second technique in predicting fiscal year 2007 reenlistments utilizes 
individual MOS characteristics of the explanatory variables.  The second of the two 
methods utilized to predict fiscal year 2007 reenlistment by MOS is done by using the 
coefficients from the validation reenlistment model but using individual MOS mean 
values for the explanatory variables rather than USMC-wide means.  The hypothesis is 
that individual MOSs characteristics are different from one another.  For example, it is 
known that there are no female Marines in MOS 0341 and that certain MOS deploy more 
heavily than others.  The reenlistment prediction for each MOS is calculated using the 
coefficients from the validation model.  The following equation shows the calculation 
method of the predicted reenlistment rate for MOS 0341 for FY 2007, which is .23. 
1/1 exp(logit),
where, 
( 2.66767(1)) (.1479(4)) ( .18529(.0122)) ( .50(.0472)) ( .4548(.1801))





= − + + − + − + −
+ − + − + + + +
+ − + .6818)) (1.097(.1975)) (1.24511(0) ( .1247(1))
.23
+ + + −
=
 
Table 14 describes the values of the coefficient (β ) and the explanatory variable ( X ) 
used to estimate the predicted reenlistment probability for MOS 0341. 
Table 14.   Prediction Values Used in MOS Average Predictions for MOS 0341 
Variable Logit Coefficient (β )  Value Used ( X ) 
Constant -2.6676 1 in all models 
SRB Multiple .1479 Actual SRB offered in FY07 for 
each MOS (4.0 for MOS 0341 in 
the example) 
1-100 days deployed -.18529 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.0122 for 0341 in the 
example)  
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101-200 days deployed -.500 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.0472 for 0341 in the 
example) 
201-300 days deployed -.4548 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.1801 for 0341 in the 
example) 
301-400 days deployed -.5161 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.3199 for 0341 in the 
example) 
>400 days deployed -.4655 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.4133 for 0341 in the 
example) 
FY06 .4475 1 For all MOS Predictions 
(FY07 is more like FY06 than 
any other FY in the sample 
Married .63907 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.4580 for 0341 in the 
example) 
Female -.28433 Individual MOS average for 
FY07  (0 for 0341 in the 
example) 
E4 .787 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.6818 for 0341 in the 
example) 
E5 1.0197 Individual MOS average for 
FY07 (.1975 for 0341 in the 
example) 
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E6 1.24511 Individual MOS average for 
FY07  (0 for 0341 in the 
example) 
MOS dummies -.1247 (0341) varies by 
MOS 
1 for the MOS being predicted; 
0 for all others 
 
The predictive accuracy of this method is better than the first method.  The 
average percent prediction error for the 27 high-density MOSs is reduced from .147 in 
the first method to .12.  In the example for MOS 0341 the first method predicted a .26 
reenlistment rate, while the second method predicted a .23 reenlistment rate.  The actual 
reenlistment rate for MOS 0341 in 2007 was .23, making the second method a more 
accurate predictor (zero prediction error).  However, 7 of the 27 MOSs were predicted 
more accurately using the first method.  Overall, the second method appears to be a better 
predictor, at least for the 27 high-density MOSs.  However, the second method is far 
more labor intensive, because the planner must calculate and input the mean of the 
explanatory variables for each MOS. 
The prediction estimates from the two methods are presented in Tables 15 and 16.  
Displayed are the predicted reenlistment rate and actual reenlistment rate for the 27 high-
density MOSs selected.  Additionally, the table presents the percent prediction error for 
both methods.  MOSs that are under-predicted (predicted reenlistment rate is lower than 
the actual reenlistment rate) are displayed with parentheses and are highlighted.  Those 
MOSs that were over-predicted (predicted reenlistment rate is higher than the actual 
reenlistment rate) are displayed without parentheses and are not highlighted.  Also, the 
average percent error for each of the two methods is displayed.  The average percent error 





Table 15.   Fiscal Year 2007 Predicted Reenlistment Rates (Selected MOSs) Using 
USMC-Wide Values for the Explanatory Variables 
 
 
MOS Predicted Reenlist Rate Actual 07 Reenlist Rate Percent Error 
mos_0121 0.32 0.44 (0.27)
mos_0151 0.44 0.48 (0.08)
mos_0311 0.28 0.24 0.19
mos_0331 0.29 0.24 0.18
mos_0341 0.26 0.23 0.11
mos_0351 0.28 0.21 0.33
mos_0621 0.27 0.33 (0.19)
mos_0651 0.18 0.26 (0.31)
mos_0656 0.18 0.26 (0.33)
mos_0811 0.29 0.29 0.01
mos_1341 0.25 0.28 (0.12)
mos_1345 0.24 0.25 (0.04)
mos_1371 0.29 0.25 0.15
mos_1391 0.28 0.24 0.15
mos_1833 0.33 0.25 0.34
mos_2311 0.34 0.33 0.05
mos_3043 0.40 0.41 (0.02)
mos_3051 0.32 0.38 (0.14)
mos_3381 0.30 0.36 (0.16)
mos_3521 0.30 0.31 (0.02)
mos_3531 0.30 0.32 (0.05)
mos_3533 0.24 0.29 (0.15)
mos_5811 0.25 0.29 (0.13)
mos_6046 0.36 0.44 (0.18)
mos_6531 0.33 0.35 (0.05)
mos_6672 0.43 0.53 (0.19)
mos_7051 0.24 0.23 0.05
Average Percent Error 14.79%
FY07 Predictions Using FY07 USMC Mean Values for the x's
 
Table 16.   Fiscal Year 2007 Predicted Reenlistment Rates (Selected MOSs) Using 
Individual MOS Mean Values for the Explanatory Variables  
 
MOS Predicted Reenlist Rate Actual 07 Reenlist Rate Percent Error
mos_0121 0.36 0.44 (0.18)
mos_0151 0.47 0.48 (0.02)
mos_0311 0.25 0.24 0.04
mos_0331 0.26 0.24 0.07
mos_0341 0.23 0.23 (0.00)
mos_0351 0.24 0.21 0.14
mos_0621 0.26 0.33 (0.21)
mos_0651 0.20 0.26 (0.23)
mos_0656 0.18 0.26 (0.31)
mos_0811 0.28 0.29 (0.03)
mos_1341 0.24 0.28 (0.14)
mos_1345 0.23 0.25 (0.07)
mos_1371 0.29 0.25 0.13
mos_1391 0.27 0.24 0.13
mos_1833 0.32 0.25 0.30
mos_2311 0.34 0.33 0.04
mos_3043 0.42 0.41 0.03
mos_3051 0.31 0.38 (0.16)
mos_3381 0.29 0.36 (0.18)
mos_3521 0.32 0.31 0.04
mos_3531 0.31 0.32 (0.04)
mos_3533 0.22 0.29 (0.23)
mos_5811 0.27 0.29 (0.08)
mos_6046 0.39 0.44 (0.12)
mos_6531 0.33 0.35 (0.06)
mos_6672 0.45 0.53 (0.13)
mos_7051 0.26 0.23 0.14
Average Percent Error 12.00%




D. VALIDATION REENLISTMENT MODEL – OMITS DEPLOYMENT 
VARIABLES 
To further assess the usefulness of incorporating deployment variables into the 
prediction model, a separate validation model was estimated (using data for FY03-FY06) 
which mirrors the initial validation model, except it omits the deployment tempo 
variables.  The actual model specification is: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
( /(1 )) _ 04 05 06
4 5 6 i i
LN P P srb multiple FY FY FY married
female E E E mos
α β β β β β
β β β β β
− = + + + + +
+ + + + +∑  
Results of this model specification are listed in Table 17.  Appendix G contains the 
complete results. 
Table 17.   Logit Validation Model – No Deployment Variables (Data for FY03-
FY06) 



















mos_* (214 Binary Variables) yes a  
Observations 84191 
Constant -2.87832 
Log Likelihood 48385.01 
Chi-square 6194.56 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
 
a Coefficients displayed in Appendix G 
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1. Predictions for FY07 Omitting Deployment Variables 
The results from the validation model that omits variables for deployment tempo 
are then used to predict fiscal year 2007 MOS reenlistment rates in the same manner as in 
paragraphs C.1 and C.2 of this chapter—one using overall Marine Corps-wide mean 
values for the explanatory variables and the other using mean values for the explanatory 
variables for each MOS.  Tables 18 and 19 display the prediction results for the same 27 
high-density MOSs as in the previous two methods. 
Table 18.   Fiscal Year 2007 Predicted Reenlistment Rates (Selected MOSs) — 
Omitting Deployment Tempo Variables Using USMC-Wide Mean Values for the 
Explanatory Variables 
 




























Average Percent Error 12.70%




Table 19.   Fiscal Year 2007 Predicted Reenlistment Rates (Selected MOSs) — 
Omitting Deployment Tempo Variables Using Individual MOS Mean Values for 
the Explanatory Variables 




























Average Percent Error 11.75%
FY07 Predictions Using FY07 MOS Mean and no deployments
 
Based on the overall average percent error, the results from this method appear to 
be more accurate than from the validation model that includes deployment tempo 
variables.  However, the difference is small, especially for the prediction method that 
utilizes individual MOS mean values for the explanatory variables (Table 19).  The 
overall average percent error is only 0.25 smaller when comparing the models without 
and with deployment variables, (.1175 vice .1200).  Additionally, the prediction error 
varies by individual MOS.  For example, when using Marine Corps-wide means for the 
explanatory variables, MOS 7051 is predicted with greater accuracy using the model that 
incorporates deployment variables (.05 percent error vice .15 percent error); however, 
MOS 0151 is predicted with greater accuracy utilizing the model that omits deployment 
variables (.00 percent error vice .08 percent error).  It is clear that the accuracy of the 
prediction not only depends on the model, but also on the individual MOS being 
predicted.   
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Previous studies on retention patterns in the Navy have found similar variations in 
prediction error based on model specification.40  Hansen and Wenger found that 
excluding explanatory variables from their baseline model changed the level of over-
prediction, both up and down, depending on the variable(s) excluded.41  For example, 
they found that by excluding race and age from their baseline model the percent error of 
over-prediction changed from 2.1 in the baseline model to 0.7 in the excluded model.42  
This would appear to indicate that the model that excludes race and age is better than the 
one that includes these two variables.  However, Hansen and Wenger conclude that “the 
pay elasticity of reenlistment is highly sensitive to the choice of empirical 
specification.”43   
One additional measure of the accuracy of the model specification is the 
confidence interval around the prediction.  Although the point prediction may vary by 
MOS and may be more accurate for one model vice the other, the confidence interval 
around the prediction presents the “spread” around a prediction.  A smaller spread 
indicates a better model because the prediction error is reduced, producing a smaller 
range of possible outcomes.  This thesis examined the confidence interval around the 
prediction for the two models— one with and one without deployment tempo variables.  
The model that includes deployment tempo variables not only has larger pseudo- 2R  and 
chi-square values, it also has a narrower confidence interval around the prediction when 
compared to the model that omits deployment variables.  The combination of the higher 
pseudo- 2R and chi-square values, and the narrower confidence interval around the 
prediction suggest that incorporating deployment tempo variables in the estimating model 
is worthwhile. 
 
                                                 
40 Michael L. Hansen, and Jennie W. Wenger, “Why Do Pay Elasticity Estimates Differ?”, Center for 
Naval Analyses, March 2002, 61. 
41 Ibid., 60. 
42 Ibid., 60. 
43 Ibid., 67. 
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On the surface it may appear that the model that omits deployment variables is a 
more accurate predictor of reenlistment, but this may not necessarily be true.  It must also 
be noted that the validation contained in this chapter only analyzes predictions for one 
fiscal year and there could be unobservable factors that are not being accounted for in 
fiscal year 2007. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an analysis of the usefulness of the models contained in 
Chapter IV.  Overall, the models developed are moderately accurate in predicting 
reenlistment decisions for all MOSs.  However, the models become far more accurate 
when predicting reenlistments in what are considered high-density MOSs.  The improved 
accuracy is likely due to the large sample size of the high-density MOSs, which improves 
statistical significance.   
Table 20 displays the predicted reenlistment rate for alternate SRB multiples (0-5) 
for the 27 high-density MOSs using the Validation Model that includes deployment 
variables and using individual MOS mean values for the explanatory variables.  The 
results are comparable to the North study.44  This thesis finds that Marines in combat 
arms MOSs have smaller predicted reenlistment rates than their counterparts in the 
support MOSs, these findings are similar to those the 1994 North study. 
                                                 
44 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
34. 
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Table 20.   FY07 Predicted Reenlistment Rates (Selected MOSs) – Using Individual 
MOS Mean Values for the Explanatory Variables (SRB Multiples 0-5) 
MOS
0 1 2 3 4 5
mos_0121 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.54
mos_0151 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.65
mos_0311 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28
mos_0331 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.29
mos_0341 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.26
mos_0351 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.26
mos_0621 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.39
mos_0651 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31
mos_0656 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.29
mos_0811 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34
mos_1341 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40
mos_1345 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37
mos_1371 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40
mos_1391 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.44
mos_1833 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.41
mos_2311 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.48
mos_3043 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.60
mos_3051 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.49
mos_3381 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.47
mos_3521 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.48
mos_3531 0.29 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.46
mos_3533 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.36
mos_5811 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.39
mos_6046 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.53
mos_6531 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.45
mos_6672 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.58
mos_7051 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.41
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis developed and estimated four alternate logit models to predict 
reenlistment rates for first-term Marines by Military Occupational Specialty.  The goal 
was to determine the effect of incorporating deployment tempo into the statistical models 
on their predictive accuracy.  This technique determined the effect of the Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus multiple in a manner different from those in use by the Marine 
Corps.  The current SRB prediction model in use by Marine Corps manpower planners 
does not include controls for varying levels of deployment tempo.   
The results of the multivariate models clearly show that SRB multiples are a 
positive and statistically significant predictor of increased reenlistments.  Additionally, 
the results show that high deployment tempo is a statistically significant, independent, 
negative, predictor of reenlistments.   This thesis also analyzed the validity and statistical 
usefulness of the logit models developed.  The validation results indicate that the logit 
models are an accurate predictor of reenlistment decisions for high-density MOSs and are 
a fairly accurate predictor of reenlistment decisions for all other MOSs.   
B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How has the Increased Deployment Tempo since 9/11 Affected First-
Term Enlisted Reenlistment Rates by MOS? 
The results of this thesis indicate that the increased deployment tempo has had a 
significant negative effect on reenlistment rates.  This statement can be made due to 
several results highlighted in this thesis.  Despite overall reenlistments rates remaining 
fairly steady over time, there are several key conclusions to be drawn from this analysis.  
First, reenlistments are negatively correlated with the number of deployed days.  
Reenlistment rates appear to decrease from 35 percent for Marines with zero deployed 
days to 28 percent for Marines with more than 400 deployed days.  To explain why 
overall reenlistment rates have remained steady over time this thesis analyzed the effect 
of SRB multiples as deployment tempo increased.  Average days deployed to OIF/OEF 
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have steadily increased from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.  The average deployed 
days in fiscal year 2003 was 55 compared to 259 days in fiscal year 2007.  Additionally, 
the average SRB offer has increased over this same period.  The average SRB offer in 
fiscal year 2003 was less than 1.0, whereas, it was nearly 2.0 in fiscal year 2007.  The 
Marine Corps appears to have been steadily increasing SRB offers, across all MOSs and 
zones, in an attempt to offset the negative effect of increased deployment tempo on 
reenlistments.  This has resulted in the Marine Corps SRB budget increasing by over 
$200 million in the past five years, ($58 million in FY02 vice $268 million in FY07). 45 
2. Has the Increased Deployment Tempo Affected the Magnitude of the 
Effect of SRBs on Reenlistment Behavior? 
The results of this thesis indicate that the effect of the SRB multiple on 
reenlistment decisions has decreased over time.  This can be highlighted by the marginal 
effects of the SRB multiple developed in this thesis as compared to the results in the 
earlier North study.  However, the results of this thesis are nearly identical to those found 
in a 2006 CNA study, which had a more similar model specification and sample data.  
Table 20 displays the marginal effects of SRB multiples on reenlistment decisions from 
this study compared to the 2006 CNA study46 and the North study.47  It appears that the 
marginal effect of SRB offers on reenlistments has decreased.  However, this difference 
could also be explained by other factors.  First, North excluded “restricted MOSs” from 
his data sample, which reduced his sample size, and did not include all MOSs.  In 
contrast, this thesis and the 2006 CNA study did not exclude any MOSs from their 
samples.  Second, North’s model specification was different than those in this thesis, as 
well as those in the 2006 CNA study.  The results of this thesis are more comparable to 
the 2006 CNA, which also controlled for deployment tempo.  Therefore, it is highly 
 
 
                                                 
45 Paul Bock, e-mail to author, October 22, 2008. 
46 Hattiangadi, and Shuford, and Quester, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post 9/11 Era:  The Effects 
of Deployment Tempo on Marines With and Without Dependents,” 40. 
47 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
28. 
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likely that differences in model specification, sample restrictions, and potential structural 
changes in the reenlistment behavior of first-term Marines over time account for the 
variation in the estimated effects of SRB multiples. 
Table 21.   Estimated Marginal Effects of SRB Multiple  





.024 .0221 .0215 .0202 .024 .071 
 
3. Is There a Difference in Reenlistment Rates for Marines with and 
without Dependents? 
The results of this thesis clearly show that there is a sizeable difference in 
reenlistment rates for Marines with and without dependents.  The overall reenlistment 
rate for Marines with dependents is .37 compared to .23 for Marines without dependents.  
This finding is comparable to results found in previous CNA studies on USMC 
reenlistment.50  The adage that you “enlist the Marine and retain the family” appears to 
still hold true.  Additionally, Marines with dependents deploy less than Marines without 
dependents.  This study found that, on average, Marines without dependents deploy 21.6 
more days during their first enlistment than do Marines with dependents.  
4. What are the Effects of Not Deploying at all on Individuals’ 
Reenlistment Decisions? 
This thesis finds that not deploying at actually increases reenlistments.  Overall, 
Marines who did not deploy reenlisted at slightly higher rates than Marines who deployed 
for at least 1 day, and much higher rates than for Marines who deployed 100+ days.  
Table 21 depicts the reenlistment rates for varying levels of deployment tempo. 
 
                                                 
48 Hattiangadi, and Shuford, and Quester, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post 9/11 Era:  The Effects 
of Deployment Tempo on Marines With and Without Dependents,” 40. 
49 North, “A Cost-Effective Use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Lateral Occupational Moves,” 
28. 
50 Ibid., 11-14. 
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Table 22.    Actual Reenlistment Rates by Deployed Days 






More than 400 .277 
 
5. Is the Prediction Model More Accurate with Deployment Variables? 
The results of this thesis are not conclusive in determining if incorporating 
deployment variables into the prediction model yields a more accurate model.  The 
validation models estimated in Chapter IV show that both models, with and without 
deployment variables, had very similar results in predicting reenlistments for fiscal year 
2007.  However, this thesis, along with prior CNA studies, has shown that deployment 
tempo is a significant factor in first-term Marines’ reenlistment decisions.  Table 23 
displays the average percent prediction error for each of the validation models when 
predicting fiscal year 2007 reenlistment rates for the 27 high-density MOSs.   
Table 23.   Fiscal Year 2007 Predicted Reenlistment Rates (Selected MOSs) – 















.0147 0.127 0.12 0.117 
 
Additionally, three other statistical measures that highlight the “worth” of a 
model; the confidence interval around the prediction, pseudo- 2R , and the chi-square 
value, are all improved when the estimating models include deployment tempo variables.  
The combination of the higher pseudo- 2R and chi-square values, and the narrower 
confidence interval around the prediction suggest that incorporating deployment tempo 
variables in the estimating model is worthwhile. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Validation with Fiscal Year 2008 and 2009 Reenlistment Data  
Although this thesis attempted to validate the prediction results, the validation 
exercise was based only on one fiscal year and the results are not sufficiently strong for 
the Marine Corps to change its current method for determining SRB offers.  To further 
determine the predictive ability of the models, it is recommended that the models in this 
study be used to predict the actual reenlistment rates for fiscal year 2008, which are 
currently available, and for fiscal year 2009 when they become available later this year. 
By doing so, there would be a total of three years worth of validation results to ensure 
that the predictive accuracy of this model is acceptable.   
2. Update Model on a Fiscal Year Basis 
It is also recommended that the models developed in this thesis be updated each 
fiscal year with current reenlistment data.  Labor economic theory suggests that the 
model will remain relevant unless there have been structural changes in Marines’ 
behavior.  Given the changing nature of the “Long War”, this study recommends that the 
model be updated each fiscal year with the latest data to ensure the model is capturing 
any structural changes that may occur during this period.  Additionally, the volatile state 
of the economy and employment conditions should have a significant impact on 
reenlistment decisions in fiscal year 2008, and especially in 2009.  The data needed to 
update the logit models is readily available from the Total Force Data Warehouse and can 
be easily coded to replicate the analysis in this thesis. 
3. Incorporate Local Area Unemployment Data into the Prediction 
Models 
This thesis attempted to add proxies for economic conditions in the form of 
national-level unemployment rates; however, the results were not consistent with 
previous studies, nor with economic theory.  A more accurate measure of economic 
conditions that might affect a Marines' decision to reenlist would be in the form of local 
area unemployment rates based on a Marines' home of record.  More often than not, first-
term Marines who choose not to reenlist return to their home of record; therefore, the 
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unemployment rate for that area would more accurately account for the economic 
opportunities available to a particular Marine.  It is recommended that further research 
into first-term reenlistment decisions include local level unemployment data for a 
Marines' home of record to better account for his/her particular economic opportunities.  
The data needed for this analysis is readily available from the Total Force Data 
Warehouse and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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APPENDIX A.  MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY 
LISTING 
MOS CODE MOS TITLE 
0121 Personnel Clerk 
0151  Administrative Clerk 
0161 Postal Clerk 
0193 Personnel/Administrative Chief 
0211 Counterintelligence/HUMINT Specialist 
0231 Intelligence Specialist 
0241 Imagery Analysis Specialist 
0261 Geographic Intelligence Specialist 
0311 Rifleman 
0313 LAV Crewman 
0321 Reconnaissance Man 
0331 Machine Gunner 
0341 Mortarman 
0351 Infantry Assaultman 
0352 Anti-Tank Missileman 
0369 Infantry Unit Leader 
0411 Maintenance Management Specialist 
0431 Logistics/Embarkation Specialist 
0451 Air Delivery Specialist 
0481 Landing Support Specialist 
0511 MAGTF Planning Specialist 
0612 Tactical Switching Operator 
0613 Construction Wireman 
0614 Unit Level Circuit Switch Operator 
0619 Wire Chief 
0621 Field Radio Operator 
0622 Digital Wideband Transmission Equipment Operator 
0623 Tropospheric Scatter Radio Multi-Channel Equipment Operator  
0624 High Frequency Communication Central Operator 
0626 Fleet SATCOM Terminal Operator 
0627 SHF Satellite Communications Operator 
0629 Radio Chief 
0651 Data Network Specialist 
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MOS CODE MOS TITLE 
0656 Tactical Network Specialist 
0689 Information Assurance Technician 
0811 Field Artillery Cannoneer 
0842 Field Artillery Radar Operator 
0844 Field Artillery Fire Control Man 
0847 Artillery Meteorological Man 
0861 Fire Support Man 
1141 Electrician 
1142 Engineer Equipment Electrical Systems Technician 
1161 Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Technician 
1171 Water Support Technician 
1181 Fabric Repair Specialist 
1316 Metal Worker 
1341 Engineer Equipment Mechanic 
1345 Engineer Equipment Operator 
1361 Engineer Assistant 
1371 Combat Engineer 
1391 Bulk Fuel Specialist 
1812 M1A1 Tank Crewman 
1833 Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Crewman 
2111 Small Arms Repairer/Technician 
2131 Towed Artillery Systems Technician 
2141 Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Repairer/Technician 
2146 Main Battle Tank Repairer/Technician 
2147 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Repairer/Technician 
2161 Machinist 
2171 Electro-Optical Ordnance Repairer 
2311 Ammunition Technician 
2336 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)  
2621 Special Communications Signals Collection Operator 
2631 Electronic Intelligence Intercept Operator 
2651 Special Intelligence Systems Administrator 
2671 Middle East Cryptologic Linguist 
2673 Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguist 
2674 Cryptologic Linguist I 
2676 Cryptologic Linguist II 
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MOS CODE MOS TITLE 
2818 Personal Computer/Tactical Office Machine Repairer 
2822 Electronic Equipment Switching Technician 
2823 Technical Control Chief 
2831 AN/TRC-170 Technician 
2834 Satellite Communications Technician 
2841 Ground Radio Repairer 
2844 Ground Communications Organizational Repairer 
2846 Ground Intermediate Repairer 
2847 Telephone Systems/Personal Computer Intermediate Repairer 
2862 Electronics Maintenance Technician 
2871 Calibration Technician 
2874 Metrology Technician 
2881 2M/ATE Technician 
2887 Artillery Electronics Technician 
3043 Supply Administration and Operations Specialist 
3051 Warehouse Clerk 
3052 Packaging Specialist 
3112 Distribution Management Specialist 
3381 Food Service Specialist 
3432 Finance Technician 
3451 Financial Management Resource Analyst 
3521 Automotive Organizational Mechanic 
3529 Motor Transport Maintenance Chief 
3531 Motor Vehicle Operator 
3533 Logistics Vehicle Systems Operator 
3537 Motor Transport Operation Chief 
4066 Small Computer Systems Specialist 
4067 Programmer 
4133 Marine Corps Community Services Marine 
4341 Combat Correspondent 
4421 Legal Services Specialist 
4611 Combat Illustrator 
4612 Combat Camera Production Specialist 
4641 Combat Photographer 
4671 Combat Videographer 
5512 Member, “Commandants Own”, Drum and Bugle Corps 
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MOS CODE MOS TITLE 
5524 Musician 
5711 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Specialist 
5811 Military Police 
5821 Criminal Investigator CID Agent 
5831 Correctional Specialist 
5937 Aviation Radio Repairer 
5939 Aviation Communications Systems Technician 
5942 Aviation Radar Repairer 
5952 Air Traffic Control Navigational Aids Technician 
5953 Air Traffic Control Radar Technician 
5954 Air Traffic Control Communications Technician 
5962 Tactical Data Systems Equipment Repairer 
5963 Tactical Air Operations Module Repairer 
5974 Tactical Data Systems Administrator 
5979 Tactical Air Operations Module/Air Defense Technician 
6042 Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) Asset Manager 
6046 Aircraft Maintenance Administrative Specialist 
6048 Flight Equipment Technician 
6062 Aircraft Intermediate Level Hydraulic Mechanic 
6072 Aircraft Maintenance Supply Equipment Mechanic 
6073 Aircraft Maintenance Support Equipment Electrician 
6074 Cryogenics Equipment Operator 
6092 Aircraft Intermediate Level Structures Mechanic 
6112 Helicopter Mechanic, CH-46 
6113 Helicopter Mechanic, CH-53 
6114 Helicopter Mechanic,UH/AH-1 
6116 Tiltrotor Mechanic, MV-22 
6122 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-400/T-700 
6123 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-58 
6124 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-64 
6132 Helicopter/Tiltrotor Dynamic Components Mechanic 
6152 Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, CH-46 
6153 Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, CH-53 
6154 Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, UH/AH-1 
6156 Tiltrotor Airframe Mechanic, MV-22 
6172 Helicopter Crew Chief, CH-46 
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MOS CODE MOS TITLE 
6173 Helicopter Crew Chief, CH-53 
6174 Helicopter Crew Chief, UH-1 
6176 Tiltrotor Crew Chief, MV-22 
6212 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-8 
6213 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Mechanic, EA-6 
6214 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Mechanic 
6216 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Mechanic, KC-130 
6217 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Mechanic, F/A-18 
6222 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, F-402 
6223 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, J-52 
6226 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, T-56 
6227 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, F-404 
6232 Fixed Wing Aircraft Flight Mechanic, KC-130 
6252 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-8 
6253 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe Mechanic, EA-6 
6256 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe Mechanic, KC-130 
6257 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe Mechanic, F/A-18 
6276 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Crew Chief, KC-130 
6282 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-8 
6283 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, EA-6 
6286 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, KC-130/V-22 
6287 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, F/A-18 
6311 Aircraft Communications/Navigation/Electrical Systems Trainee 
6312 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Radar Technician, AV-8 
6313 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Radar Technician, EA-6 
6314 Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Avionics Technician 
6316 Aircraft Communications /Navigation Systems Technician, KC-130 
6317 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Radar Technician, F/A-18 
6322 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Electrical Technician, CH-46 
6323 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Electrical Technician, CH-53 
6324 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Electrical Technician, U/AH-1 
6326 Aircraft Communications /Navigation/Electrical Technician, V-22 
6332 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, AV-8 
6333 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, EA-6 
6335 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician 
6336 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, KC-130 
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MOS CODE MOS TITLE 
6337 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, F/A-18 
6386 Aircraft Electronics Countermeasures Systems Technician, EA-6B 
6412 Aircraft Communications System Technician 
6413 Aircraft Navigation Systems Technician 
6414 Advanced Aircraft Communications Systems Technician 
6423 Aviation Electronic Instrument and Cable Repair Technician 
6432 Aircraft Electrical Flight Control Systems Technician, Fixed-Wing 
6433 Aircraft Electrical Flight Control Systems Technician, Helicopter 
6461 Hybrid Test Set Technician, IMA 
6462 Avionics Test Set Technician 
6463 CASS HP Configuration Operator/Maintainer/Technician 
6464 Aircraft Inertial Navigation System Technician 
6466 CASS EO Configuration Operator/Maintainer/Technician 
6467 Consolidated Automated Support System Technician 
6482 Aircraft Electronics Countermeasures Systems Technician, Fixed-Wing 
6483 Aircraft Electronics Countermeasures Systems Technician, Helicopter 
6484 CASS EW Configuration Operator/Maintainer/Technician 
6492 Aviation Precision Measurement Equipment Repair Technician 
6493 Aviation Meteorological Equipment Technician 
6531 Aircraft Ordnance Technician 
6541 Aviation Ordnance Systems Technician 
6672 Aviation Supply Specialist 
6694 Aviation Logistics Information Management Specialist 
6821 METOC Observer 
6842 METOC Analyst Forecaster 
7011 Expeditionary Airfield Systems Technician 
7041 Aviation Operations Specialist 
7051 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Specialist 
7212 Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner 
7234 Air Control Electronics Operator 
7236 Tactical Air Defense Controller 
7242 Air Support Operations Operator 
7257 Air Traffic Controller 
7314 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operator 
7372 Tactical Systems Operator/Mission Specialist 
7382 Airborne Radio Operator/Loadmaster 
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APPENDIX B.  LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 reenlist reenlist reenlist reenlist 























































unemployment_rate   -0.09238 -0.02401 




mil_civ_pay_ratio   2.53602 2.14039 






















FY07 0.47270 0.51853   
 (0.02742)* (0.02696)*   
 86
** ** 
married 0.65306    
 (0.01406)*
** 
   
female -0.21988    
 (0.02941)*
** 
   
E4 0.77123    
 (0.02789)*
** 
   
E5 0.97482    
 (0.02973)*
** 
   
E6 1.27231    
 (0.15563)*
** 
   



























mos_0193 0.42307 0.95463 0.97493 1.19529 
 (0.79566) (0.77029) (0.76528) (0.76489) 
mos_0211 -0.71558 -0.33364 -0.30879 -0.26134 
 (0.81058) (0.80573) (0.80398) (0.80303) 


















mos_0261 -0.18003 -0.12960 -0.13363 -0.11174 
 (0.20933) (0.20626) (0.20523) (0.20460) 
mos_0313 -0.08958 -0.03921 -0.03935 -0.05834 
 (0.09077) (0.08944) (0.08935) (0.08919) 









mos_0331 0.01193 0.05679 0.05895 0.05050 
 (0.05177) (0.05097) (0.05089) (0.05082) 
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mos_0341 -0.11408 -0.07203 -0.07160 -0.07705 
 (0.05234)*
* 
(0.05155) (0.05147) (0.05140) 
mos_0351 -0.06770 -0.05170 -0.04703 -0.05066 
 (0.06168) (0.06076) (0.06067) (0.06059) 







mos_0369 -1.34214 -0.64735 -0.63402 -0.56573 
 (0.77680)* (0.75736) (0.75479) (0.75374) 




















































mos_0613 0.12890 0.25673 0.26887 0.38114 
 (0.22127) (0.21763) (0.21705) (0.21568)* 
mos_0614 0.10095 0.10610 0.12229 0.13029 
 (0.13684) (0.13495) (0.13484) (0.13448) 
mos_0619 1.07059 1.52352 1.46138 1.39331 
 (1.42007) (1.41500) (1.41516) (1.41476) 









mos_0622 -0.10286 -0.06262 -0.06659 -0.07856 
 (0.10441) (0.10321) (0.10293) (0.10270) 
mos_0623 1.31400 1.11981 1.23976 1.51857 
 (1.41684) (1.41497) (1.41495) (1.41488) 
mos_0624 0.25093 0.44774 0.23572 0.23248 
 (0.66745) (0.66362) (0.66049) (0.65890) 
mos_0626 -0.93360 -0.92035 -0.87099 -0.85972 
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 (0.75396) (0.74573) (0.74496) (0.74420) 
mos_0627 0.02136 0.11043 0.09490 0.08870 
 (0.17780) (0.17554) (0.17492) (0.17451) 
mos_0629 0.01553 0.69760 0.70446 0.74132 
 (1.23872) (1.23126) (1.22723) (1.22585) 
mos_0651 -0.10177 -0.06298 -0.04601 0.04092 
 (0.08766) (0.08653) (0.08628) (0.08596) 
mos_0656 -0.09000 -0.03062 -0.01047 0.04422 
 (0.08144) (0.08044) (0.08017) (0.07995) 
mos_0689 0.50105 1.09346 1.16899 1.26898 
 (1.51062) (1.44234) (1.43467) (1.41765) 









mos_0842 0.32130 0.38861 0.37376 0.32988 
 (0.22553) (0.22282)* (0.22211)* (0.22168) 































































mos_1181 0.38880 0.52645 0.51683 0.57760 
 (0.28210) (0.27743)* (0.27674)* (0.27604)*
* 






















































































































mos_2161 0.27585 0.35125 0.34754 0.41885 
 (0.19153) (0.18819)* (0.18737)* (0.18680)*
* 

















































mos_2671 -0.44953 -0.22177 -0.20651 -0.19025 
 (0.18148)*
* 
(0.17898) (0.17851) (0.17821) 
mos_2673 -0.10987 0.03727 0.05636 0.23224 
 (0.26681) (0.26221) (0.26114) (0.26032) 
mos_2674 -0.03671 0.10580 0.13022 0.24339 
 (0.18824) (0.18544) (0.18479) (0.18421) 
mos_2676 -0.03668 0.14048 0.15949 0.24612 
 (0.20111) (0.19811) (0.19708) (0.19655) 































mos_2834 0.39485 0.66818 0.67773 0.63959 
 (0.64287) (0.63598) (0.62923) (0.62732) 
















mos_2846 0.05978 0.19779 0.18227 0.21600 
 (0.10548) (0.10397)* (0.10374)* (0.10344)*
* 
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mos_2847 -0.16267 0.04145 0.05693 0.09903 
 (0.10537) (0.10394) (0.10365) (0.10336) 







mos_2871 -0.30226 -0.14999 -0.12580 -0.02153 
 (0.28948) (0.28423) (0.28315) (0.28252) 
mos_2874 0.44607 0.85806 0.76915 0.69648 
 (1.24129) (1.22572) (1.22561) (1.22539) 
mos_2881 0.11685 0.27393 0.25858 0.31432 
 (0.17012) (0.16741) (0.16703) (0.16656)* 
mos_2887 0.15111 0.33171 0.31357 0.36749 
 (0.32890) (0.32461) (0.32137) (0.32017) 








































































mos_3529 0.81403 1.56446 1.44010 1.46841 
 (1.01794) (1.01432) (1.00555) (1.00111) 









mos_3533 0.31022 0.33543 0.32472 0.30919 
 (0.06899)* (0.06794)* (0.06774)* (0.06759)*
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** ** ** ** 
mos_3537 -0.08221 0.38106 0.58307 0.79390 
 (1.23985) (1.22618) (1.22534) (1.22535) 









mos_4067 0.17605 0.26784 0.33374 0.50123 
 (0.21224) (0.20902) (0.20799) (0.20760)*
* 
mos_4133 0.09115 0.70825 0.65375 0.75328 
 (1.29001) (1.23257) (1.22800) (1.22573) 


















mos_4611 0.56321 0.49896 0.49258 0.69816 
 (0.32632)* (0.31726) (0.31551) (0.31498)*
* 























mos_5512 0.51906 0.42666 0.54662 0.82542 
 (1.22571) (1.22562) (1.22560) (1.22552) 



























mos_5821 0.17852 0.90871 0.87761 0.99373 
 (0.94229) (0.92918) (0.92268) (0.91460) 
mos_5831 0.52233 0.55656 0.56966 0.78884 
 (0.10330)* (0.10161)* (0.10117)* (0.10044)*
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** ** ** ** 









mos_5939 -0.33828 -0.44068 -0.41206 -0.37719 
 (0.45759) (0.45297) (0.45260) (0.45198) 


































mos_5962 0.17160 0.27769 0.26892 0.33767 
 (0.20632) (0.20245) (0.20157) (0.20111)* 
mos_5963 0.10080 0.29271 0.31462 0.43151 
 (0.30167) (0.29642) (0.29489) (0.29415) 
mos_5974 0.42504 0.46975 0.56329 0.63624 
 (0.54219) (0.53630) (0.53591) (0.53406) 
mos_5979 -0.33081 -0.11602 -0.15040 -0.03814 
 (0.50327) (0.49867) (0.49836) (0.49725) 



























mos_6062 0.11679 0.29848 0.28879 0.34523 
 (0.15655) (0.15411)* (0.15359)* (0.15319)*
* 



















mos_6074 0.20906 0.34965 0.37150 0.48307 
 (0.25007) (0.24501) (0.24407) (0.24352)*
* 

























mos_6114 0.02364 0.21346 0.23122 0.25503 




mos_6116 0.20496 0.30150 0.35416 0.56249 
 (0.43993) (0.43235) (0.43078) (0.42970) 


























































































mos_6176 1.05230 1.12031 1.23120 1.53510 
 (0.65632) (0.64642)* (0.64620)* (0.64598)*
* 
mos_6212 -0.07801 0.15666 0.15513 0.16867 
 (0.15045) (0.14866) (0.14823) (0.14786) 
mos_6213 -0.10280 0.15695 0.16564 0.22301 
 (0.36761) (0.36478) (0.36440) (0.36379) 
mos_6214 -0.24386 -0.12096 -0.15741 -0.20584 
 (0.42092) (0.41593) (0.41595) (0.41535) 





















mos_6223 -0.15742 0.15829 0.19794 0.36611 
 (0.39527) (0.39125) (0.39089) (0.39015) 
mos_6226 0.24358 0.52435 0.55465 0.71246 






















mos_6252 -0.00665 0.26862 0.27904 0.29129 
 (0.16101) (0.15871)* (0.15829)* (0.15792)* 
mos_6253 0.11242 0.35080 0.33670 0.42598 
 (0.32365) (0.31902) (0.31855) (0.31759) 









mos_6257 -0.02638 0.19644 0.21000 0.30931 
 (0.15083) (0.14891) (0.14843) (0.14796)*
 96
* 
mos_6276 -0.29467 -0.08390 -0.03511 0.06147 
 (0.21586) (0.21280) (0.21234) (0.21164) 
mos_6282 0.03409 0.27995 0.31559 0.32266 
 (0.28645) (0.28349) (0.28304) (0.28221) 







mos_6286 0.39045 0.51445 0.51189 0.56151 
 (0.41197) (0.40391) (0.40196) (0.39995) 
















mos_6312 -0.12859 0.02356 0.02981 0.07331 
 (0.20011) (0.19738) (0.19689) (0.19641) 
mos_6313 0.45417 0.56162 0.60154 0.70716 




mos_6314 -0.06454 0.05702 0.05756 0.01057 
 (0.43997) (0.43236) (0.43080) (0.43048) 













































mos_6326 0.40955 0.54353 0.67129 0.91955 
 (0.43905) (0.43182) (0.43025) (0.42940)*
* 
mos_6332 -0.09341 0.08021 0.05962 0.09011 
 (0.19869) (0.19583) (0.19516) (0.19460) 
mos_6333 -0.07809 0.04029 0.07919 0.18626 
 97
 (0.29146) (0.28806) (0.28781) (0.28740) 



























mos_6386 0.42487 0.48662 0.50560 0.59274 
 (0.30116) (0.29826) (0.29725)* (0.29692)*
* 


















mos_6414 0.59061 1.14330 1.21369 1.46145 
 (1.44219) (1.41495) (1.41494) (1.41532) 







mos_6432 0.22460 0.33897 0.36633 0.50418 













mos_6461 -0.09390 -0.00730 0.00193 0.16203 
 (0.30107) (0.29745) (0.29658) (0.29584) 


















mos_6464 -0.47929 -0.21193 -0.16992 0.05139 
 (0.40595) (0.40040) (0.39958) (0.39913) 







mos_6467 0.12484 0.20456 0.22012 0.35593 
 98
 (0.18983) (0.18693) (0.18620) (0.18553)* 


















mos_6484 0.07959 0.22067 0.25747 0.49749 
 (0.23674) (0.23299) (0.23268) (0.23220)*
* 




















































mos_6821 0.12033 0.19106 0.21566 0.27677 
 (0.18246) (0.17899) (0.17814) (0.17758) 
































mos_7212 0.26274 0.30902 0.30008 0.31765 
 (0.10859)* (0.10654)* (0.10631)* (0.10595)*
 99
* ** ** ** 



























mos_7251 0.09528 -0.26365 -0.24882 -0.17715 
 (1.10864) (1.10315) (1.09956) (1.09623) 







mos_7314 0.01897 0.25471 0.27641 0.21292 
 (0.33246) (0.32723) (0.32601) (0.32570) 



























Observations 105371 105371 105371 105371 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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APPENDIX C.  FY 2008 PREDICTED REENLISTMENT RATES BY MOS FOR ALTERNATE SRB 
MULTIPLES 
  
SRB Multiple of 0 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 1 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 2 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 3 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 4 
Model #  
SRB Multiple of 5 
Model # 
MOS  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
0121  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.36  0.38 0.37 0.33 0.39  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.41  0.43 0.42 0.38 0.43  0.46 0.45 0.41 0.46  0.49 0.48 0.43 0.48
0151  0.46 0.45 0.41 0.46  0.49 0.48 0.43 0.49  0.52 0.50 0.46 0.51  0.55 0.53 0.48 0.54  0.57 0.56 0.51 0.56  0.60 0.58 0.54 0.58
0161  0.45 0.43 0.39 0.42  0.48 0.45 0.41 0.44  0.51 0.48 0.44 0.46  0.54 0.51 0.46 0.49  0.57 0.53 0.49 0.51  0.59 0.56 0.51 0.54
0193  0.27 0.39 0.35 0.42  0.29 0.41 0.37 0.44  0.32 0.44 0.39 0.47  0.35 0.46 0.42 0.49  0.37 0.49 0.44 0.52  0.40 0.52 0.47 0.54
0211  0.11 0.15 0.13 0.14  0.12 0.16 0.14 0.16  0.13 0.18 0.15 0.17  0.14 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.16 0.21 0.18 0.20  0.18 0.23 0.20 0.21
0231  0.27 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.32 0.34 0.29 0.31  0.34 0.36 0.31 0.33  0.37 0.39 0.34 0.35  0.40 0.41 0.36 0.38
0241  0.58 0.70 0.66 0.70  0.61 0.72 0.68 0.72  0.63 0.74 0.71 0.74  0.66 0.76 0.73 0.76  0.69 0.78 0.75 0.78  0.71 0.80 0.77 0.79
0261  0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16  0.19 0.19 0.16 0.18  0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19  0.22 0.23 0.19 0.21  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22  0.27 0.26 0.23 0.24
0311  0.20 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.21 0.21 0.18 0.19  0.24 0.23 0.20 0.21  0.26 0.25 0.21 0.23  0.28 0.27 0.23 0.24  0.30 0.29 0.25 0.26
0313  0.18 0.19 0.16 0.17  0.20 0.20 0.18 0.19  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25
0321  0.25 0.26 0.23 0.24  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.30 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.32 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.32  0.37 0.37 0.33 0.34
0331  0.20 0.20 0.18 0.19  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.24  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.31 0.30 0.26 0.27
0341  0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17  0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25
0351  0.19 0.19 0.16 0.17  0.20 0.20 0.17 0.19  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22  0.27 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.29 0.28 0.24 0.25
0352  0.21 0.23 0.20 0.21  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.23  0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24  0.27 0.29 0.25 0.26  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.28  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.30
0369  0.06 0.11 0.10 0.11  0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12  0.07 0.13 0.12 0.13  0.08 0.15 0.13 0.14  0.09 0.16 0.14 0.15  0.10 0.18 0.15 0.17
0411  0.34 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.37 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.39 0.38 0.34 0.37  0.42 0.40 0.36 0.39  0.45 0.43 0.38 0.41  0.48 0.46 0.41 0.43
0431  0.37 0.38 0.34 0.37  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.39  0.42 0.43 0.39 0.41  0.45 0.45 0.41 0.44  0.48 0.48 0.44 0.46  0.51 0.51 0.46 0.49
0451  0.29 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.32 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.34 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.37 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.40 0.37 0.32 0.35  0.43 0.39 0.35 0.37
0481  0.22 0.24 0.20 0.22  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.27  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.34 0.35 0.30 0.31
0511  0.27 0.27 0.23 0.26  0.29 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.32 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.34 0.34 0.29 0.32  0.37 0.36 0.31 0.34  0.40 0.38 0.33 0.37
0612  0.25 0.26 0.23 0.25  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.26  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.28  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.30  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.32  0.38 0.38 0.33 0.35
0613  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.26  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.28  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.33 0.35 0.30 0.34
0614  0.21 0.21 0.18 0.20  0.23 0.23 0.20 0.22  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23  0.28 0.27 0.24 0.25  0.30 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.32 0.31 0.27 0.29
0619  0.42 0.53 0.46 0.47  0.44 0.55 0.49 0.49  0.47 0.58 0.51 0.52  0.50 0.60 0.54 0.54  0.53 0.63 0.56 0.56  0.56 0.65 0.59 0.59
0621  0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.30 0.30 0.27 0.28  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.30  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.37 0.38 0.33 0.35  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.37
0622  0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17  0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25
0623  0.48 0.42 0.41 0.50  0.50 0.45 0.43 0.52  0.53 0.48 0.46 0.55  0.56 0.50 0.48 0.57  0.59 0.53 0.51 0.60  0.62 0.56 0.54 0.62
0624  0.24 0.27 0.20 0.22  0.26 0.30 0.22 0.23  0.28 0.32 0.24 0.25  0.31 0.34 0.26 0.27  0.33 0.37 0.28 0.29  0.36 0.39 0.30 0.31
0626  0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08  0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09  0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10  0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11  0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12  0.15 0.14 0.12 0.13
0627  0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19  0.22 0.23 0.20 0.21  0.24 0.25 0.21 0.23  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.24  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.26  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.28
 102
0629  0.20 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.22 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.24 0.37 0.33 0.36  0.26 0.40 0.35 0.38  0.28 0.42 0.38 0.40  0.31 0.45 0.40 0.43
0651  0.18 0.18 0.16 0.19  0.20 0.20 0.17 0.20  0.22 0.22 0.19 0.22  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.26 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.27
0656  0.18 0.19 0.17 0.19  0.20 0.21 0.18 0.20  0.22 0.22 0.20 0.22  0.24 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.26 0.26 0.23 0.25  0.28 0.28 0.25 0.27
0689  0.29 0.42 0.39 0.44  0.31 0.44 0.42 0.46  0.34 0.47 0.44 0.49  0.36 0.50 0.47 0.51  0.39 0.52 0.49 0.53  0.42 0.55 0.52 0.56
0811  0.23 0.23 0.20 0.22  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23  0.27 0.27 0.24 0.25  0.29 0.29 0.26 0.27  0.32 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.31
0842  0.25 0.26 0.23 0.23  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.30 0.31 0.26 0.27  0.32 0.33 0.28 0.29  0.35 0.35 0.30 0.31  0.38 0.38 0.33 0.33
0844  0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.34 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.37 0.38 0.34 0.35  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.38
0847  0.35 0.37 0.32 0.36  0.37 0.40 0.35 0.38  0.40 0.42 0.37 0.40  0.43 0.45 0.39 0.42  0.46 0.47 0.42 0.45  0.49 0.50 0.44 0.47
0861  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.36 0.37 0.32 0.34  0.39 0.39 0.35 0.36
1141  0.29 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.32 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.34 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.37 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.40 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.43 0.40 0.35 0.37
1142  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.32 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.37 0.37 0.32 0.34  0.40 0.39 0.34 0.36  0.42 0.42 0.37 0.38
1161  0.26 0.25 0.22 0.24  0.28 0.27 0.24 0.26  0.30 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.33 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.35 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.38 0.37 0.32 0.34
1171  0.31 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.33 0.33 0.28 0.30  0.36 0.35 0.31 0.32  0.39 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.42 0.40 0.35 0.37  0.44 0.42 0.37 0.39
1181  0.26 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.31 0.34 0.29 0.32  0.34 0.36 0.31 0.34  0.36 0.38 0.34 0.36  0.39 0.41 0.36 0.39
1316  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.25  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.36 0.36 0.31 0.33  0.38 0.38 0.33 0.35
1341  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.36 0.37 0.32 0.34  0.39 0.39 0.34 0.36
1345  0.24 0.25 0.21 0.23  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.24  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.26  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.28  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.30  0.36 0.36 0.31 0.32
1361  0.31 0.30 0.27 0.29  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.36 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.39 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.41 0.40 0.35 0.37  0.44 0.42 0.38 0.40
1371  0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24  0.27 0.29 0.25 0.26  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.28  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.30  0.34 0.36 0.31 0.32  0.37 0.38 0.33 0.34
1391  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.30 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.33 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.35 0.35 0.30 0.32  0.38 0.37 0.32 0.34  0.41 0.40 0.35 0.36
1812  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.27  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.33 0.35 0.30 0.31  0.36 0.37 0.33 0.33  0.39 0.40 0.35 0.35  0.41 0.42 0.37 0.37
1833  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.27  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.31  0.36 0.37 0.32 0.33  0.39 0.39 0.35 0.35
2111  0.31 0.31 0.28 0.31  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.36 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.39 0.39 0.34 0.37  0.42 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.44 0.44 0.39 0.42
2131  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.24  0.28 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.30 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.33 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.35 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.38 0.37 0.32 0.34
2141  0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.27 0.30 0.27 0.28  0.30 0.32 0.29 0.30  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.37 0.40 0.35 0.37
2146  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.31  0.36 0.37 0.32 0.33  0.38 0.39 0.34 0.36  0.41 0.42 0.37 0.38  0.44 0.44 0.39 0.40
2147  0.26 0.28 0.25 0.26  0.28 0.30 0.27 0.28  0.31 0.33 0.29 0.30  0.33 0.35 0.31 0.32  0.36 0.38 0.33 0.34  0.39 0.40 0.35 0.36
2161  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.36 0.37 0.32 0.35
2171  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.23  0.25 0.27 0.23 0.25  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.32 0.34 0.29 0.31  0.35 0.36 0.31 0.33
2311  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.38 0.39 0.34 0.37  0.40 0.41 0.37 0.39  0.43 0.44 0.39 0.42  0.46 0.46 0.41 0.44
2336  0.63 0.70 0.68 0.69  0.66 0.72 0.70 0.71  0.68 0.74 0.72 0.73  0.71 0.76 0.74 0.75  0.73 0.78 0.76 0.77  0.75 0.80 0.78 0.78
2621  0.27 0.29 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.35 0.36 0.33 0.36  0.37 0.39 0.35 0.38  0.40 0.41 0.37 0.40
2631  0.25 0.27 0.23 0.26  0.27 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.32 0.34 0.29 0.32  0.34 0.36 0.31 0.34  0.37 0.39 0.33 0.37
2651  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.27  0.27 0.29 0.26 0.28  0.30 0.31 0.28 0.30  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.37 0.38 0.34 0.37
2671  0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15  0.15 0.18 0.15 0.17  0.16 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.18 0.21 0.18 0.19  0.20 0.23 0.20 0.21  0.22 0.25 0.21 0.23
2673  0.18 0.20 0.17 0.22  0.20 0.22 0.19 0.23  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.25  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.27  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.29  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.31
2674  0.19 0.21 0.19 0.22  0.21 0.23 0.20 0.24  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.25  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.27  0.27 0.29 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.31 0.28 0.31
2676  0.19 0.22 0.19 0.22  0.21 0.24 0.21 0.24  0.23 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.25 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.31
2818  0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97  0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97  0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98  0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
 103
2822  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.28  0.27 0.29 0.26 0.30  0.29 0.31 0.28 0.32  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.34 0.36 0.32 0.37  0.37 0.39 0.35 0.39
2823  0.38 0.47 0.42 0.41  0.41 0.50 0.44 0.44  0.44 0.53 0.47 0.46  0.47 0.55 0.50 0.48  0.50 0.58 0.52 0.51  0.52 0.60 0.55 0.53
2831  0.28 0.29 0.26 0.28  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.36 0.36 0.32 0.34  0.39 0.39 0.34 0.36  0.41 0.41 0.37 0.39
2834  0.27 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.29 0.34 0.30 0.31  0.31 0.37 0.33 0.34  0.34 0.39 0.35 0.36  0.37 0.42 0.37 0.38  0.39 0.44 0.40 0.40
2841  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99  1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
2844  0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.23 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.25 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.33 0.35 0.30 0.32
2846  0.21 0.23 0.19 0.21  0.23 0.25 0.21 0.23  0.25 0.27 0.23 0.25  0.27 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.31
2847  0.17 0.20 0.17 0.19  0.19 0.22 0.19 0.21  0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.23 0.26 0.22 0.24  0.25 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.28
2862  0.45 0.62 0.59 0.62  0.47 0.65 0.61 0.64  0.50 0.67 0.63 0.66  0.53 0.70 0.66 0.68  0.56 0.72 0.68 0.70  0.59 0.74 0.70 0.72
2871  0.15 0.17 0.15 0.18  0.17 0.19 0.16 0.19  0.19 0.20 0.18 0.21  0.20 0.22 0.19 0.22  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24  0.24 0.26 0.23 0.26
2874  0.28 0.36 0.30 0.31  0.30 0.39 0.32 0.33  0.32 0.41 0.35 0.35  0.35 0.44 0.37 0.37  0.38 0.46 0.39 0.39  0.40 0.49 0.42 0.42
2881  0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.26 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.33 0.28 0.31  0.33 0.35 0.30 0.33
2887  0.22 0.25 0.21 0.24  0.24 0.27 0.23 0.26  0.26 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.29 0.32 0.27 0.30  0.31 0.34 0.29 0.32  0.34 0.36 0.31 0.34
3043  0.41 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.44 0.43 0.39 0.43  0.47 0.46 0.42 0.45  0.49 0.49 0.44 0.48  0.52 0.51 0.47 0.50  0.55 0.54 0.49 0.52
3051  0.35 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.37 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.40 0.39 0.34 0.37  0.43 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.46 0.44 0.39 0.42  0.49 0.47 0.42 0.44
3052  0.41 0.41 0.37 0.41  0.44 0.44 0.39 0.43  0.46 0.47 0.42 0.45  0.49 0.49 0.44 0.48  0.52 0.52 0.47 0.50  0.55 0.54 0.49 0.53
3112  0.37 0.37 0.33 0.39  0.39 0.40 0.36 0.41  0.42 0.42 0.38 0.44  0.45 0.45 0.41 0.46  0.48 0.47 0.43 0.49  0.51 0.50 0.46 0.51
3381  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.38 0.38 0.33 0.36  0.40 0.40 0.35 0.38  0.43 0.43 0.38 0.40  0.46 0.45 0.40 0.42
3432  0.44 0.43 0.39 0.44  0.46 0.46 0.41 0.46  0.49 0.48 0.44 0.48  0.52 0.51 0.46 0.51  0.55 0.53 0.49 0.53  0.58 0.56 0.51 0.56
3451  0.41 0.41 0.37 0.43  0.44 0.44 0.39 0.46  0.47 0.46 0.42 0.48  0.50 0.49 0.44 0.50  0.52 0.51 0.47 0.53  0.55 0.54 0.50 0.55
3521  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.34 0.36 0.32 0.34  0.37 0.39 0.34 0.36  0.40 0.41 0.36 0.38  0.42 0.44 0.39 0.40
3529  0.35 0.54 0.46 0.49  0.38 0.56 0.48 0.51  0.41 0.59 0.51 0.54  0.44 0.61 0.53 0.56  0.47 0.64 0.56 0.58  0.50 0.66 0.58 0.61
3531  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.34  0.38 0.38 0.34 0.36  0.41 0.41 0.36 0.38  0.44 0.43 0.39 0.41
3533  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23  0.27 0.27 0.23 0.25  0.30 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.32 0.32 0.27 0.29  0.35 0.34 0.29 0.31  0.37 0.36 0.32 0.33
3537  0.18 0.26 0.26 0.33  0.20 0.28 0.28 0.35  0.22 0.30 0.31 0.37  0.24 0.33 0.33 0.39  0.26 0.35 0.35 0.42  0.29 0.37 0.37 0.44
4066  0.93 0.93 0.91 0.93  0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94  0.95 0.94 0.93 0.94  0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95  0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95  0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96
4067  0.23 0.24 0.22 0.27  0.25 0.26 0.24 0.29  0.27 0.28 0.26 0.31  0.29 0.30 0.28 0.33  0.32 0.32 0.30 0.35  0.34 0.35 0.32 0.37
4133  0.21 0.33 0.28 0.32  0.23 0.35 0.30 0.34  0.25 0.38 0.32 0.36  0.27 0.40 0.34 0.38  0.30 0.43 0.37 0.41  0.32 0.45 0.39 0.43
4341  0.31 0.30 0.27 0.32  0.34 0.32 0.29 0.34  0.36 0.35 0.31 0.36  0.39 0.37 0.33 0.38  0.42 0.40 0.36 0.41  0.45 0.42 0.38 0.43
4421  0.40 0.37 0.33 0.39  0.43 0.40 0.36 0.41  0.46 0.42 0.38 0.43  0.48 0.45 0.41 0.46  0.51 0.48 0.43 0.48  0.54 0.50 0.46 0.50
4611  0.30 0.28 0.25 0.31  0.32 0.31 0.27 0.33  0.35 0.33 0.29 0.35  0.38 0.35 0.31 0.37  0.40 0.38 0.33 0.39  0.43 0.40 0.35 0.42
4612  0.31 0.27 0.24 0.28  0.33 0.29 0.26 0.30  0.36 0.31 0.28 0.32  0.39 0.33 0.30 0.34  0.42 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.44 0.38 0.34 0.39
4641  0.29 0.28 0.24 0.28  0.32 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.35 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.37 0.35 0.30 0.34  0.40 0.37 0.33 0.36  0.43 0.40 0.35 0.38
4671  0.30 0.29 0.26 0.30  0.33 0.31 0.28 0.32  0.35 0.33 0.30 0.34  0.38 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.41 0.38 0.34 0.39  0.44 0.41 0.37 0.41
5512  0.29 0.27 0.26 0.33  0.31 0.29 0.28 0.36  0.34 0.31 0.30 0.38  0.37 0.34 0.32 0.40  0.39 0.36 0.34 0.42  0.42 0.39 0.37 0.45
5524  0.34 0.36 0.32 0.38  0.36 0.38 0.34 0.40  0.39 0.41 0.37 0.42  0.42 0.43 0.39 0.45  0.45 0.46 0.42 0.47  0.48 0.48 0.44 0.49
5711  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.38 0.38 0.34 0.37  0.41 0.41 0.36 0.39  0.44 0.43 0.39 0.41  0.46 0.46 0.41 0.44
5811  0.24 0.25 0.22 0.26  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.28  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.37 0.37 0.32 0.36
5821  0.23 0.37 0.32 0.37  0.25 0.40 0.35 0.39  0.27 0.42 0.37 0.42  0.29 0.45 0.40 0.44  0.32 0.48 0.42 0.47  0.34 0.50 0.45 0.49
 104
5831  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.33  0.32 0.32 0.28 0.35  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.37  0.37 0.37 0.32 0.39  0.40 0.39 0.35 0.42  0.42 0.42 0.37 0.44
5937  0.34 0.32 0.29 0.32  0.37 0.35 0.32 0.34  0.40 0.37 0.34 0.36  0.42 0.40 0.36 0.38  0.45 0.42 0.38 0.41  0.48 0.45 0.41 0.43
5939  0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13  0.16 0.15 0.13 0.14  0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15  0.20 0.18 0.15 0.17  0.22 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.24 0.21 0.18 0.20
5942  0.28 0.30 0.25 0.28  0.31 0.32 0.27 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.29 0.33  0.36 0.37 0.31 0.35  0.39 0.39 0.34 0.37  0.41 0.42 0.36 0.39
5952  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.31 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.34 0.38 0.34 0.36  0.37 0.40 0.36 0.38  0.39 0.43 0.38 0.41  0.42 0.45 0.41 0.43
5953  0.24 0.27 0.24 0.27  0.26 0.29 0.26 0.29  0.28 0.31 0.28 0.31  0.31 0.33 0.30 0.33  0.33 0.36 0.32 0.35  0.36 0.38 0.34 0.38
5954  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.35 0.37 0.32 0.35  0.37 0.39 0.34 0.37  0.40 0.42 0.37 0.39
5962  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24  0.25 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.32 0.33 0.28 0.31  0.34 0.35 0.30 0.33
5963  0.21 0.24 0.22 0.25  0.23 0.26 0.23 0.27  0.25 0.29 0.25 0.29  0.28 0.31 0.27 0.31  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.33  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.35
5974  0.27 0.28 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.30 0.28 0.31  0.32 0.32 0.30 0.33  0.35 0.35 0.32 0.36  0.37 0.37 0.35 0.38  0.40 0.40 0.37 0.40
5979  0.15 0.18 0.15 0.17  0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19  0.18 0.21 0.17 0.20  0.20 0.23 0.19 0.22  0.22 0.25 0.21 0.24  0.24 0.27 0.22 0.25
6042  0.31 0.33 0.28 0.32  0.34 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.36 0.37 0.33 0.36  0.39 0.40 0.35 0.38  0.42 0.42 0.37 0.41  0.45 0.45 0.40 0.43
6046  0.36 0.38 0.34 0.37  0.38 0.40 0.36 0.40  0.41 0.43 0.38 0.42  0.44 0.45 0.41 0.44  0.47 0.48 0.43 0.47  0.50 0.51 0.46 0.49
6048  0.23 0.27 0.23 0.26  0.25 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.28 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.33 0.36 0.31 0.35  0.35 0.38 0.34 0.37
6062  0.21 0.25 0.21 0.24  0.24 0.27 0.23 0.25  0.26 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.28 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.33 0.36 0.31 0.33
6072  0.30 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.32 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.35 0.39 0.34 0.38  0.38 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.40 0.44 0.39 0.42  0.43 0.46 0.42 0.45
6073  0.27 0.30 0.27 0.30  0.29 0.32 0.29 0.32  0.31 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.34 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.37 0.40 0.35 0.39  0.39 0.42 0.38 0.41
6074  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.26  0.25 0.28 0.24 0.28  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.37
6092  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.30 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.33 0.37 0.33 0.36  0.35 0.39 0.35 0.38  0.38 0.42 0.37 0.40  0.41 0.44 0.40 0.43
6112  0.25 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.27 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.35 0.38 0.33 0.35  0.38 0.40 0.36 0.38
6113  0.21 0.24 0.21 0.24  0.23 0.26 0.23 0.25  0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.27 0.30 0.27 0.29  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33
6114  0.20 0.23 0.20 0.22  0.22 0.25 0.22 0.24  0.24 0.27 0.24 0.26  0.26 0.29 0.26 0.27  0.28 0.31 0.28 0.29  0.31 0.34 0.30 0.31
6116  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.28  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.30  0.27 0.29 0.26 0.32  0.30 0.31 0.28 0.34  0.32 0.33 0.30 0.36  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.38
6122  0.27 0.32 0.29 0.33  0.29 0.35 0.31 0.35  0.32 0.37 0.34 0.37  0.34 0.40 0.36 0.40  0.37 0.42 0.38 0.42  0.40 0.45 0.41 0.44
6123  0.28 0.33 0.30 0.34  0.30 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.33 0.38 0.34 0.39  0.36 0.41 0.36 0.41  0.38 0.43 0.39 0.43  0.41 0.46 0.41 0.46
6124  0.38 0.43 0.38 0.42  0.40 0.46 0.41 0.45  0.43 0.48 0.43 0.47  0.46 0.51 0.46 0.49  0.49 0.53 0.48 0.52  0.52 0.56 0.51 0.54
6132  0.30 0.33 0.30 0.33  0.32 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.35 0.38 0.34 0.38  0.38 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.40 0.43 0.39 0.42  0.43 0.46 0.41 0.45
6152  0.23 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.25 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.27 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.30 0.35 0.30 0.32  0.32 0.37 0.32 0.34  0.35 0.40 0.35 0.36
6153  0.23 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.25 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.27 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.30 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.32 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.35 0.39 0.35 0.37
6154  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.29 0.33 0.28 0.31  0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33  0.34 0.38 0.33 0.35  0.36 0.40 0.35 0.37  0.39 0.43 0.37 0.39
6156  0.40 0.47 0.44 0.52  0.43 0.50 0.46 0.54  0.45 0.53 0.49 0.56  0.48 0.55 0.51 0.59  0.51 0.58 0.54 0.61  0.54 0.60 0.56 0.63
6172  0.23 0.26 0.23 0.25  0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.35
6173  0.22 0.25 0.22 0.25  0.24 0.27 0.24 0.27  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.29 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.31 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.34 0.37 0.33 0.35
6174  0.28 0.32 0.29 0.31  0.31 0.34 0.31 0.33  0.33 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.36 0.39 0.36 0.38  0.39 0.42 0.38 0.40  0.41 0.44 0.40 0.42
6176  0.41 0.42 0.41 0.50  0.44 0.45 0.43 0.53  0.47 0.48 0.46 0.55  0.50 0.50 0.48 0.58  0.53 0.53 0.51 0.60  0.55 0.56 0.53 0.62
6212  0.18 0.22 0.19 0.21  0.20 0.24 0.21 0.22  0.22 0.26 0.22 0.24  0.24 0.28 0.24 0.26  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.29 0.32 0.28 0.30
6213  0.18 0.22 0.19 0.22  0.20 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.22 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.24 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.31
6214  0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15  0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16  0.19 0.21 0.17 0.18  0.21 0.23 0.19 0.19  0.23 0.25 0.20 0.21  0.25 0.27 0.22 0.22
6216  0.25 0.28 0.25 0.29  0.27 0.30 0.27 0.31  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.34  0.32 0.35 0.32 0.36  0.34 0.37 0.34 0.38  0.37 0.40 0.36 0.40
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6217  0.22 0.27 0.23 0.27  0.24 0.29 0.25 0.29  0.26 0.31 0.27 0.31  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.33  0.31 0.36 0.31 0.35  0.34 0.38 0.34 0.37
6222  0.23 0.30 0.27 0.31  0.25 0.32 0.29 0.33  0.27 0.34 0.31 0.35  0.30 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.32 0.39 0.35 0.40  0.35 0.42 0.38 0.42
6223  0.17 0.22 0.20 0.24  0.19 0.24 0.21 0.26  0.21 0.26 0.23 0.28  0.23 0.28 0.25 0.30  0.25 0.30 0.27 0.32  0.27 0.32 0.29 0.34
6226  0.24 0.29 0.26 0.31  0.26 0.31 0.28 0.33  0.28 0.33 0.30 0.35  0.31 0.36 0.32 0.37  0.33 0.38 0.34 0.40  0.36 0.41 0.37 0.42
6227  0.33 0.37 0.33 0.39  0.36 0.39 0.36 0.41  0.39 0.42 0.38 0.43  0.41 0.44 0.40 0.46  0.44 0.47 0.43 0.48  0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50
6232  0.78 0.78 0.70 0.74  0.80 0.80 0.72 0.76  0.82 0.81 0.74 0.78  0.83 0.83 0.76 0.79  0.85 0.84 0.78 0.81  0.86 0.86 0.80 0.82
6252  0.19 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.21 0.26 0.23 0.24  0.23 0.28 0.25 0.26  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.28  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.30 0.35 0.31 0.32
6253  0.21 0.26 0.22 0.25  0.23 0.28 0.24 0.27  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.30 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.33 0.37 0.32 0.35
6256  0.31 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.34 0.38 0.35 0.39  0.36 0.41 0.37 0.41  0.39 0.43 0.39 0.43  0.42 0.46 0.42 0.46  0.45 0.49 0.44 0.48
6257  0.19 0.23 0.20 0.23  0.21 0.25 0.21 0.25  0.23 0.27 0.23 0.27  0.25 0.29 0.25 0.29  0.27 0.31 0.27 0.31  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.33
6276  0.15 0.18 0.16 0.19  0.17 0.20 0.18 0.20  0.19 0.21 0.19 0.22  0.20 0.23 0.21 0.24  0.22 0.25 0.23 0.26  0.24 0.27 0.24 0.27
6282  0.20 0.24 0.22 0.23  0.22 0.26 0.23 0.25  0.24 0.28 0.25 0.27  0.26 0.30 0.27 0.29  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.31 0.35 0.31 0.33
6283  0.33 0.38 0.33 0.36  0.36 0.40 0.35 0.39  0.39 0.43 0.38 0.41  0.41 0.45 0.40 0.43  0.44 0.48 0.42 0.46  0.47 0.51 0.45 0.48
6286  0.26 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.29 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.31 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.34 0.36 0.31 0.34  0.36 0.38 0.33 0.36  0.39 0.41 0.36 0.38
6287  0.26 0.30 0.27 0.30  0.28 0.32 0.29 0.32  0.31 0.34 0.31 0.34  0.33 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.36 0.39 0.35 0.39  0.39 0.42 0.38 0.41
6311  0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92  0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93  0.94 0.93 0.92 0.93  0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94  0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95  0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95
6312  0.18 0.20 0.17 0.19  0.19 0.22 0.19 0.21  0.21 0.23 0.20 0.22  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.26  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.28
6313  0.28 0.30 0.27 0.31  0.30 0.32 0.29 0.33  0.33 0.34 0.31 0.35  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.38 0.39 0.35 0.40  0.41 0.42 0.38 0.42
6314  0.19 0.20 0.17 0.18  0.20 0.22 0.19 0.20  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.21  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.23  0.27 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.29 0.30 0.26 0.26
6316  0.32 0.34 0.31 0.35  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.37 0.39 0.35 0.40  0.40 0.42 0.38 0.42  0.43 0.44 0.40 0.44  0.46 0.47 0.43 0.47
6317  0.33 0.34 0.31 0.35  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.38  0.38 0.39 0.35 0.40  0.41 0.42 0.38 0.42  0.43 0.44 0.40 0.44  0.46 0.47 0.43 0.47
6322  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.35 0.37 0.32 0.35  0.38 0.39 0.35 0.37  0.41 0.42 0.37 0.39  0.43 0.44 0.39 0.41
6323  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.31 0.34 0.31 0.33  0.33 0.37 0.33 0.36  0.36 0.39 0.35 0.38  0.38 0.42 0.37 0.40  0.41 0.44 0.40 0.43
6324  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33  0.35 0.38 0.33 0.35  0.38 0.40 0.36 0.38  0.40 0.43 0.38 0.40  0.43 0.45 0.40 0.42
6326  0.27 0.29 0.28 0.35  0.29 0.32 0.30 0.38  0.32 0.34 0.32 0.40  0.34 0.36 0.35 0.42  0.37 0.39 0.37 0.45  0.40 0.41 0.39 0.47
6332  0.18 0.21 0.18 0.19  0.20 0.22 0.19 0.21  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.23  0.24 0.26 0.22 0.24  0.26 0.29 0.24 0.26  0.28 0.31 0.26 0.28
6333  0.18 0.20 0.18 0.21  0.20 0.22 0.19 0.23  0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24  0.24 0.26 0.23 0.26  0.26 0.28 0.25 0.28  0.29 0.30 0.27 0.30
6335  0.90 0.92 0.91 0.92  0.91 0.93 0.91 0.92  0.92 0.94 0.92 0.93  0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94  0.93 0.95 0.94 0.94  0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95
6336  0.29 0.32 0.29 0.32  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.37 0.39 0.35 0.39  0.40 0.42 0.38 0.41  0.43 0.45 0.40 0.44
6337  0.29 0.32 0.28 0.33  0.31 0.35 0.31 0.35  0.34 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.36 0.40 0.35 0.40  0.39 0.42 0.37 0.42  0.42 0.45 0.40 0.44
6386  0.27 0.28 0.25 0.28  0.30 0.30 0.27 0.30  0.32 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.35 0.35 0.31 0.35  0.37 0.37 0.33 0.37  0.40 0.40 0.36 0.39
6412  0.25 0.29 0.25 0.29  0.27 0.31 0.27 0.31  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.33  0.32 0.36 0.31 0.35  0.35 0.38 0.33 0.37  0.37 0.40 0.36 0.40
6413  0.24 0.28 0.24 0.28  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29  0.29 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.31 0.35 0.30 0.34  0.33 0.37 0.32 0.36  0.36 0.39 0.35 0.38
6414  0.31 0.43 0.40 0.49  0.33 0.46 0.43 0.51  0.36 0.48 0.45 0.53  0.38 0.51 0.48 0.56  0.41 0.54 0.50 0.58  0.44 0.56 0.53 0.60
6423  0.23 0.26 0.23 0.26  0.26 0.28 0.25 0.28  0.28 0.30 0.27 0.30  0.30 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.33 0.35 0.31 0.35  0.35 0.37 0.33 0.37
6432  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.27  0.26 0.27 0.24 0.29  0.28 0.29 0.26 0.31  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.33  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.35  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.37
6433  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.33 0.35 0.30 0.33  0.36 0.37 0.32 0.35  0.38 0.40 0.35 0.37  0.41 0.42 0.37 0.39  0.44 0.45 0.39 0.42
6461  0.18 0.19 0.17 0.21  0.20 0.21 0.18 0.22  0.22 0.23 0.20 0.24  0.24 0.25 0.21 0.26  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.27  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.29
6462  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.34  0.33 0.35 0.30 0.36  0.36 0.37 0.33 0.38  0.38 0.40 0.35 0.40  0.41 0.42 0.37 0.43  0.44 0.45 0.40 0.45
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6463  0.41 0.42 0.39 0.45  0.44 0.45 0.41 0.47  0.47 0.48 0.44 0.49  0.49 0.50 0.46 0.52  0.52 0.53 0.49 0.54  0.55 0.56 0.51 0.57
6464  0.13 0.16 0.14 0.19  0.14 0.18 0.16 0.20  0.16 0.19 0.17 0.22  0.18 0.21 0.19 0.24  0.19 0.23 0.20 0.25  0.21 0.25 0.22 0.27
6466  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.29 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.31 0.34 0.30 0.35  0.34 0.37 0.32 0.37  0.37 0.39 0.34 0.39  0.39 0.42 0.37 0.41
6467  0.22 0.23 0.20 0.24  0.24 0.25 0.22 0.26  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.28  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.29  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.32  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.34
6482  0.30 0.33 0.30 0.34  0.33 0.36 0.33 0.37  0.35 0.38 0.35 0.39  0.38 0.41 0.37 0.41  0.41 0.43 0.40 0.44  0.44 0.46 0.42 0.46
6483  0.39 0.41 0.37 0.40  0.42 0.44 0.39 0.42  0.45 0.47 0.41 0.45  0.48 0.49 0.44 0.47  0.51 0.52 0.46 0.49  0.54 0.55 0.49 0.52
6484  0.21 0.23 0.21 0.27  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.28  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.30  0.27 0.29 0.26 0.33  0.30 0.31 0.28 0.35  0.32 0.34 0.30 0.37
6492  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.33  0.30 0.34 0.30 0.35  0.33 0.36 0.32 0.37  0.36 0.39 0.35 0.40  0.38 0.41 0.37 0.42  0.41 0.44 0.39 0.44
6493  0.31 0.35 0.30 0.34  0.34 0.37 0.32 0.36  0.36 0.40 0.34 0.38  0.39 0.42 0.37 0.41  0.42 0.45 0.39 0.43  0.45 0.47 0.41 0.45
6531  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.36 0.36 0.31 0.34  0.38 0.38 0.33 0.36  0.41 0.41 0.36 0.38  0.44 0.43 0.38 0.41
6541  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.31  0.34 0.34 0.30 0.33  0.37 0.37 0.32 0.35  0.39 0.39 0.34 0.38  0.42 0.42 0.37 0.40  0.45 0.44 0.39 0.42
6672  0.40 0.41 0.37 0.42  0.43 0.44 0.40 0.44  0.46 0.46 0.42 0.47  0.49 0.49 0.45 0.49  0.52 0.52 0.47 0.51  0.55 0.54 0.50 0.54
6694  0.30 0.29 0.26 0.30  0.32 0.31 0.28 0.32  0.35 0.34 0.30 0.34  0.37 0.36 0.32 0.36  0.40 0.38 0.34 0.39  0.43 0.41 0.37 0.41
6821  0.22 0.23 0.20 0.22  0.24 0.24 0.22 0.24  0.26 0.26 0.23 0.26  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.28  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.32
6842  0.33 0.40 0.36 0.40  0.35 0.43 0.39 0.42  0.38 0.45 0.41 0.44  0.41 0.48 0.44 0.47  0.43 0.51 0.46 0.49  0.46 0.53 0.49 0.52
7011  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24  0.26 0.27 0.24 0.26  0.28 0.29 0.26 0.28  0.30 0.32 0.28 0.30  0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32  0.35 0.36 0.32 0.34
7041  0.41 0.41 0.37 0.41  0.43 0.43 0.39 0.43  0.46 0.46 0.42 0.45  0.49 0.49 0.44 0.48  0.52 0.51 0.47 0.50  0.55 0.54 0.49 0.52
7051  0.24 0.25 0.22 0.25  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.27  0.28 0.29 0.25 0.29  0.30 0.31 0.27 0.31  0.33 0.33 0.29 0.33  0.35 0.36 0.31 0.35
7212  0.24 0.25 0.21 0.23  0.26 0.27 0.23 0.25  0.29 0.29 0.25 0.27  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.29  0.34 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.36 0.36 0.31 0.33
7234  0.27 0.31 0.27 0.30  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.32 0.36 0.31 0.34  0.35 0.38 0.34 0.36  0.37 0.41 0.36 0.38  0.40 0.43 0.38 0.41
7236  0.57 0.64 0.59 0.59  0.60 0.66 0.62 0.61  0.63 0.68 0.64 0.64  0.66 0.71 0.66 0.66  0.68 0.73 0.68 0.68  0.71 0.75 0.71 0.70
7242  0.34 0.37 0.33 0.35  0.36 0.39 0.35 0.37  0.39 0.42 0.38 0.39  0.42 0.44 0.40 0.42  0.45 0.47 0.43 0.44  0.48 0.50 0.45 0.47
7251  0.21 0.16 0.13 0.16  0.23 0.17 0.15 0.17  0.25 0.19 0.16 0.18  0.28 0.20 0.17 0.20  0.30 0.22 0.19 0.21  0.32 0.24 0.21 0.23
7257  0.23 0.26 0.23 0.26  0.25 0.28 0.25 0.28  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.30  0.29 0.32 0.28 0.32  0.32 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.34 0.37 0.33 0.36
7314  0.20 0.24 0.21 0.21  0.22 0.26 0.23 0.23  0.24 0.28 0.24 0.25  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.27  0.28 0.32 0.28 0.29  0.31 0.35 0.31 0.31
7372  0.37 0.41 0.35 0.41  0.40 0.43 0.38 0.43  0.43 0.46 0.40 0.45  0.46 0.49 0.43 0.48  0.49 0.51 0.45 0.50  0.52 0.54 0.48 0.53
7382  0.31 0.33 0.29 0.32  0.34 0.35 0.31 0.34  0.36 0.38 0.33 0.36  0.39 0.40 0.36 0.39  0.42 0.43 0.38 0.41  0.45 0.45 0.41 0.43
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APPENDIX D.  MICROSOFT EXCEL MODELS 
The following table explains the Microsoft Excel models contained in this 
appendix.    The values for the explanatory variables can be changed to reflect the 
conditions of the Marine Corps at the time of prediction.  The values for the explanatory 
variables in the four models contained in this appendix were used to predict fiscal year 
2008 reenlistment rates with an SRB multiple of zero.  The table below depicts the values 
for model #1 only.  Each MOS has its own predicted reenlistment probability based on 
the inputs in the model.  Each MOS has its own logit formula for calculating the 
predicted reenlistment rate at a given SRB multiple. 
 
Variable Logit Coefficient Input Value 
Constant -2.65973 1 in all models 
SRB Multiple .116 SRB Multiple to be analyzed 
(0 in model #1) 
0 days deployed 0 (omitted group 
from models) 
USMC wide average for FY07 
(.2039206 in model #1) 
1-100 days deployed -.09009 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.0216816 in model #1)  
101-200 days deployed -.40787 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.1305149 in model #1) 
201-300 days deployed -.37492 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.1981105 in model #1) 
301-400 days deployed -.40938 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.1930562 in model #1) 
>400 days deployed -.3307 USMC wide average for FY07 
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(.2527161 in model #1) 
FY03 0 (omitted group 
from models) 
0 
FY04 .63848 0 
FY05 .55789 0 
FY06 .42581 0 
FY07 .4727 1 For all MOS Predictions (FY07 
is more like FY08 than any other 
FY in the sample) 
Married .65306 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.4692962 in model #1) 
Female -.21988 USMC wide average for FY07  
(.0600378 in model #1) 
E3 0 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.0846481 in model #1) 
E4 .77123 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.5838451 in model #1) 
E5 .97482 USMC wide average for FY07  
(.3300897 in model #1) 
E6 1.27231 USMC wide average for FY07 
(.00147171 model #1) 
MOS dummies Varies by MOS 1 for the MOS being predicted; 0 

























































APPENDIX E.  VALIDATION REGRESSION MODEL 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
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APPENDIX F.  FY07 PREDICTION RESULTS (USMC WIDE MEAN 
VALUES FOR X’S) 
MOS Predicted Reenlist Rate Actual 07 Reenlist Rate Percent Error 
mos_0121 0.32 0.44 (0.27)
mos_0151 0.44 0.48 (0.08)
mos_0161 0.43 0.45 (0.06)
mos_0211 0.11 0.33 (0.67)
mos_0231 0.41 0.31 0.35 
mos_0261 0.30 0.15 1.02 
mos_0311 0.28 0.24 0.19 
mos_0313 0.27 0.24 0.13 
mos_0321 0.37 0.36 0.04 
mos_0331 0.29 0.24 0.18 
mos_0341 0.26 0.23 0.11 
mos_0351 0.28 0.21 0.33 
mos_0352 0.34 0.23 0.49 
mos_0411 0.35 0.36 (0.01)
mos_0431 0.37 0.43 (0.12)
mos_0451 0.32 0.32 0.01 
mos_0481 0.24 0.24 (0.00)
mos_0511 0.32 0.37 (0.14)
mos_0612 0.25 0.37 (0.34)
mos_0613 0.19 0.30 (0.38)
mos_0614 0.21 0.31 (0.31)
mos_0621 0.27 0.33 (0.19)
mos_0622 0.18 0.26 (0.31)
mos_0627 0.23 0.44 (0.48)
mos_0651 0.18 0.26 (0.31)
mos_0656 0.18 0.26 (0.33)
mos_0811 0.29 0.29 0.01 
mos_0842 0.27 0.26 0.04 
mos_0844 0.34 0.35 (0.02)
mos_0847 0.42 0.13 2.39 
mos_0861 0.38 0.41 (0.09)
mos_1141 0.28 0.23 0.20 
mos_1142 0.31 0.25 0.26 
mos_1161 0.25 0.22 0.11 
mos_1171 0.29 0.32 (0.11)
mos_1316 0.26 0.21 0.20 
mos_1341 0.25 0.28 (0.12)
mos_1345 0.24 0.25 (0.04)
mos_1361 0.31 0.22 0.40 
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mos_1371 0.29 0.25 0.15 
mos_1391 0.28 0.24 0.15 
mos_1812 0.33 0.32 0.03 
mos_1833 0.33 0.25 0.34 
mos_2111 0.30 0.30 0.01 
mos_2131 0.24 0.36 (0.32)
mos_2141 0.33 0.25 0.31 
mos_2146 0.40 0.33 0.21 
mos_2147 0.32 0.41 (0.23)
mos_2161 0.21 0.46 (0.54)
mos_2171 0.30 0.17 0.76 
mos_2311 0.34 0.33 0.05 
mos_2621 0.30 0.33 (0.10)
mos_2631 0.37 0.28 0.32 
mos_2651 0.35 0.38 (0.08)
mos_2671 0.20 0.24 (0.17)
mos_2673 0.26 0.33 (0.21)
mos_2674 0.25 0.52 (0.51)
mos_2676 0.27 0.30 (0.10)
mos_2818 0.97 1.00 (0.03)
mos_2822 0.26 0.40 (0.35)
mos_2831 0.39 0.44 (0.11)
mos_2841 0.99 1.00 (0.01)
mos_2844 0.25 0.40 (0.38)
mos_2846 0.21 0.38 (0.45)
mos_2847 0.18 0.30 (0.40)
mos_2871 0.18 0.08 1.16 
mos_2881 0.31 0.19 0.66 
mos_2887 0.34 0.11 2.07 
mos_3043 0.40 0.41 (0.02)
mos_3051 0.32 0.38 (0.14)
mos_3052 0.37 0.49 (0.25)
mos_3112 0.33 0.45 (0.26)
mos_3381 0.30 0.36 (0.16)
mos_3432 0.46 0.38 0.20 
mos_3451 0.44 0.41 0.08 
mos_3521 0.30 0.31 (0.02)
mos_3531 0.30 0.32 (0.05)
mos_3533 0.24 0.29 (0.15)
mos_4066 0.93 1.00 (0.07)
mos_4341 0.37 0.28 0.33 
mos_4421 0.36 0.53 (0.32)
mos_4612 0.29 0.42 (0.31)
mos_4641 0.26 0.36 (0.27)
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mos_4671 0.28 0.43 (0.36)
mos_5524 0.36 0.34 0.08 
mos_5711 0.33 0.36 (0.09)
mos_5811 0.25 0.29 (0.13)
mos_5831 0.28 0.38 (0.28)
mos_5939 0.13 0.24 (0.46)
mos_5942 0.30 0.10 2.16 
mos_5952 0.25 0.50 (0.50)
mos_5953 0.24 0.18 0.32 
mos_5954 0.27 0.27 0.00 
mos_5962 0.19 0.56 (0.65)
mos_5979 0.10 0.25 (0.59)
mos_6042 0.32 0.49 (0.35)
mos_6046 0.36 0.44 (0.18)
mos_6048 0.22 0.40 (0.46)
mos_6062 0.22 0.27 (0.18)
mos_6072 0.30 0.41 (0.28)
mos_6073 0.29 0.28 0.05 
mos_6074 0.19 0.52 (0.64)
mos_6092 0.30 0.35 (0.15)
mos_6112 0.25 0.40 (0.37)
mos_6113 0.25 0.21 0.22 
mos_6114 0.24 0.22 0.07 
mos_6116 0.38 0.21 0.78 
mos_6122 0.28 0.40 (0.31)
mos_6123 0.34 0.33 0.01 
mos_6124 0.47 0.36 0.28 
mos_6132 0.31 0.31 0.03 
mos_6152 0.23 0.31 (0.26)
mos_6153 0.26 0.27 (0.03)
mos_6154 0.29 0.35 (0.19)
mos_6156 0.48 0.50 (0.03)
mos_6172 0.29 0.35 (0.16)
mos_6173 0.30 0.29 0.04 
mos_6174 0.38 0.39 (0.03)
mos_6212 0.18 0.33 (0.47)
mos_6213 0.19 0.23 (0.17)
mos_6214 0.18 0.25 (0.27)
mos_6216 0.27 0.34 (0.22)
mos_6217 0.23 0.40 (0.43)
mos_6222 0.26 0.31 (0.17)
mos_6226 0.21 0.50 (0.59)
mos_6227 0.31 0.63 (0.50)
mos_6252 0.21 0.21 0.02 
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mos_6253 0.24 0.25 (0.03)
mos_6256 0.29 0.50 (0.42)
mos_6257 0.17 0.36 (0.53)
mos_6276 0.18 0.28 (0.33)
mos_6282 0.19 0.31 (0.38)
mos_6283 0.36 0.60 (0.40)
mos_6286 0.27 0.33 (0.18)
mos_6287 0.26 0.35 (0.26)
mos_6312 0.18 0.30 (0.39)
mos_6313 0.36 0.10 2.63 
mos_6314 0.20 0.33 (0.41)
mos_6316 0.32 0.60 (0.47)
mos_6317 0.39 0.27 0.45 
mos_6322 0.34 0.34 (0.01)
mos_6323 0.34 0.41 (0.17)
mos_6324 0.33 0.48 (0.31)
mos_6326 0.39 0.42 (0.07)
mos_6332 0.20 0.42 (0.53)
mos_6333 0.23 0.15 0.52 
mos_6336 0.31 0.56 (0.45)
mos_6337 0.34 0.24 0.41 
mos_6386 0.33 0.22 0.46 
mos_6412 0.25 0.28 (0.12)
mos_6413 0.24 0.28 (0.15)
mos_6423 0.22 0.31 (0.28)
mos_6432 0.27 0.19 0.41 
mos_6433 0.31 0.38 (0.20)
mos_6461 0.21 0.25 (0.15)
mos_6462 0.34 0.22 0.55 
mos_6463 0.54 0.29 0.88 
mos_6464 0.11 0.50 (0.79)
mos_6466 0.28 0.29 (0.03)
mos_6467 0.23 0.43 (0.45)
mos_6482 0.29 0.46 (0.36)
mos_6483 0.40 0.40 (0.00)
mos_6484 0.20 0.50 (0.60)
mos_6492 0.27 0.41 (0.33)
mos_6493 0.36 0.36 (0.02)
mos_6531 0.33 0.35 (0.05)
mos_6541 0.34 0.35 (0.03)
mos_6672 0.43 0.53 (0.19)
mos_6694 0.31 0.29 0.06 
mos_6821 0.30 0.23 0.34 
mos_6842 0.39 0.50 (0.22)
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mos_7011 0.25 0.19 0.37 
mos_7041 0.42 0.47 (0.11)
mos_7051 0.24 0.23 0.05 
mos_7212 0.30 0.26 0.14 
mos_7234 0.38 0.28 0.35 
mos_7236 0.72 0.50 0.43 
mos_7242 0.40 0.36 0.10 
mos_7257 0.34 0.40 (0.14)
mos_7314 0.31 0.09 2.46 
mos_7372 0.38 0.47 (0.19)
mos_7382 0.32 0.33 (0.04)
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APPENDIX G.  VALIDATION REGRESSION MODEL—OMITS 
DEPLOYMENT VARIABLES 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
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